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Abstract
 The period of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1998 known as ‘the 
Troubles’ and the era of apartheid from 1948 to 1994 in South Africa were both characterized by 
violent sociopolitical conflict involving youth as active participants in paramilitary organizations 
and violent sociopolitical protest. While youth violence of the past was signified politically, 
persistent youth violence in these two nations is often regarded by scholars as purposeless, being 
attached to no direct political goals. So, what is the place of violence in the symbolic universe of 
post-conflict youth? How do youth in South Africa and Northern Ireland experience and 
understand violence in their everyday lives? And how do their approaches to violence determine 
their abilities to function in society? To answer these questions, I have conducted qualitative, 
semi-structured interviews in both Northern Ireland and South Africa among seventy street 
children, gang members, and high school and college students. Respondents were asked to define 
themselves as youth, describe their understanding of justifications for violent behavior and 
experiences of violence in their communities, and propose solutions to address violence in their 
nations. In interpreting the results, I employed a conceptual framework of youth agency which 
argues that violence is part of the discursive processes through which youth position themselves 
in their communities as purposive actors. The comparative findings indicate that South African 
youth have a much more personal and nuanced understanding of both youth agency and violence 
than do Northern Irish youth, who regard violence in spatially and emotionally remote terms. By 
acknowledging that young people are purposive agents engaged in a process of interpreting and 
attaching significance to violence, my research aims to provide an innovative perspective to aid 
conflict resolution by empowering the subjects of violence with the capacity to become 
protagonists in its overcoming. 
Keywords: Youth, violence, Northern Ireland, South Africa, agency
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Symbolic Associations of Violence Among Northern Irish and South African Youth
 In the Summer of 2009, I was teaching basic literacy and math skills to a class of street 
children through a local non-profit in Worcester, South Africa when some friends asked me to 
spend a weekend in Cape Town. All weekend, my introductions were followed by a, “You would 
simply not believe the place she is staying in,” amended with a hasty, “But we forget that good 
people live there too.” 
 Like too many white South Africans, my friends held on to the sensationalized opinion 
that former blacks-only townships are unique hotbeds of violent crime, rampant drug abuse, and 
gangsterism. Esselen Park was certainly a far cry from their gated fortress in their wealthy Cape 
Town neighborhood. Yet, after living in the Coloured1 township of Esselen Park a mere three 
weeks, I was already persuaded that this place could be anywhere in the world, plagued by the 
same social problems common to deprived communities elsewhere. 
 Speaking with students at a local high school in Esselen Park, I learned of the ways in 
which violence impacted their everyday lives. The students recounted an incident earlier in the 
week in which a shooting had occurred inside their schoolyard. The victim was a former 
classmate who had dropped out of school after joining a gang, and was targeted after he tried to 
desert. In the wake of the incident, many students described feeling at risk as they were forced to 
cross gang lines on their daily walk to school. Others were themselves gang members, or had 
family members in gangs. Some sympathized with those involved, believing them to be 
defenders of the community against unwanted outsiders. Each was engaged in interpreting and 
internalizing events like this on an individual basis. 
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1 ʻColouredʼ was one of the racial categories established during apartheid and is still used today to refer to 
the offspring of the Khoikhoi and white settlers or the Griqua and the Khoikhoi.
 These youth were not simply passive victims of violence, nor merely marginalized 
hoodlums who perpetrated it, but actors engaged in assigning meanings to the violence they 
experienced. Their signification of violence, in turn, shaped not only their perspective on its 
causes, but also the ways in which they addressed it. Some chose to ignore it, others spoke out 
vehemently against it, while still others sympathized and even participated in violence 
themselves. 
Overview of Relevant Research
 While young people’s own views on the place of violence in society are often nuanced 
and complex, scholars often regard youth violence today as less rational and more anomic when 
compared with a past where militant politics addressed political oppression or socioeconomic 
exclusion. South Africanists have looked at violence during the apartheid-era as a multi-layered 
phenomenon signified politically within the direct confrontation between liberation movements 
and the oppressive policies of the Apartheid regime. However, in the democratic context of post-
apartheid South Africa, persisting violence is often regarded as simply disruptive and irrational, 
as it is less clearly attached to social and political goals.
  A similar shift from politically significant to anomic violence has occurred in Northern 
Ireland, another society characterized by recent sociopolitical conflict, which I visited in Autumn 
of 2010. While in Northern Ireland, I met many young people who described the recent rise in 
rioting and anti-social behavior among youth since the 1998 comprehensive peace agreement as 
‘recreational,’ stemming from boredom and lack of alternative activities. This was in contrast to 
the violent struggle of armed groups during the conflict, which was signified within opposition to 
the Orange State and British government. Nevertheless, Northern Irish youth were employing 
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their condemnation, support or indifference towards persisting violence as part of the way they 
positioned themselves in their community and society in general.
Research Questions
 It was clear that the meanings both Northern Irish and South African youth assigned to 
their daily experiences with violence were an important part of strategies and discourses that 
defined their place in their communities. Yet, literature on persisting violence in Northern Ireland 
and South Africa rarely focuses on young people’s agency. So, what is the place of violence in 
the symbolic universe of post-conflict youth? How do youth in South Africa and Northern 
Ireland experience and understand violence in their everyday lives? And how do their approaches 
to violence determine their ability to function in society?
Statement of Purpose
 As British dependencies, both Northern Ireland and South Africa experienced a history of 
anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle where young people were both victims and perpetrators 
of violence. Both conflicts were imbued with political, heavily masculine symbolism, from the 
murals of the Shankhill Road in Northern Ireland to the rhythmic stomping of the toyi-toyi dance 
in South Africa. 
 In the past, such political symbolism organized violence in ways that connected it to 
broader goals and channeled its capacity for social disruptiveness. However, now that transition 
to a more inclusive political order has been achieved in both cases, the persistence of violence in 
these societies seems rather to testify to their enduring social inequalities and economic 
uncertainties. How these societies address persisting violence in their young people will be of 
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decisive importance in both preventing civil unrest and challenging social division among future 
generations. 
 Further, having undergone successful peace processes, Northern Ireland and South Africa 
are unique laboratories to observe and test strategies addressing the persistence of youth violence 
in other emerging post-conflict nations. A study of youth violence in these two nations can 
indicate practical approaches to serving young people in post-conflict societies throughout the 
world. As such, my thesis and continued research in this area can contribute to the conversation 
on conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies not only in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 
but in other transitional and post-conflict societies.
 This thesis will explore how youth in societies suffering from recent conflict and its 
accompanying social traumas understand violence when past signification of violence as 
functioning to attain political goals are in decline. To this purpose, I will use the concept of 
“symbolic associations” of violence, which assumes that violence is not simply the result of 
marginalization, nor as the output of a behavioral pathology, but is part of discursive processes 
through which subjects position themselves in their communities.
 By acknowledging that young people are actors engaged in a process of interpreting and 
attaching significance to violence, my approach understands the disruptive conduct of young 
people as neither inexplicable nor irrational. It rather takes such signifying capacities as the basis 
for interventions to resolve conflict. As such, my approach to studying the relationship of youth 
and violence in post-conflict societies aims to provide an innovative perspective empowering the 
subjects of violence with the capacity to become protagonists in its overcoming.
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Thesis Organization
 This research will focus on a broad range of Northern Irish and South African youths’ 
engagement with and interpretation of their experience with violence in a post-conflict context. I 
will begin with a brief overview of the historical context of the conflicts in both Northern Ireland 
and South Africa, followed by a critical analysis of relevant literature defining youth violence 
and explaining its causes. Here, I will provide the conceptual framework which I have utilized in 
discussing the findings of this study, one which identifies youth violence as a form of youth 
agency. Next, I will explain my methodology and describe the biographical characteristics of the 
study sample.
 Then, in discussing the results of the comparative fieldwork associated with this study, I 
will first address the ambiguities associated with the term “youth” itself, and the ways in which it  
refers to both young people’s social status and their own process of self-identification and 
belonging in this category. I will then assess to what extent youth in post-conflict Northern 
Ireland and South Africa justify violent events not only through moral evaluation, but also 
through the purpose they attach to violence in relation to social and community problems. By 
considering the opinions of the youth in question, I will be attentive to determining their 
proposed alternative approaches to social problems. Finally, I will conclude with policy 
recommendations, which incorporate the perspectives of post-conflict youth, as well as 
emphasizing questions for further study in this area.
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Historical Overview
 In order to study the symbolic associations of violence among youth in Northern Ireland 
and South Africa today, we must first understanding the historical context in which they live with 
particular regard to the sociopolitical role of violence. In this section, I provide an historical 
overview of South Africa from apartheid to democracy and Northern Ireland’s development from 
the context of political violence roots known as ‘the Troubles’ to the current post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
South Africa
  Literally translated as ‘apartness,’ ‘apartheid’ was a policy of political, social and 
economic separation on the basis of race pursued by the National Party regime in South Africa 
from 1948 to 1994 (Clark and Worger 2004: 3). Although apartheid legislation was in effect for 
less than fifty years, the policies pursued during this period, and the violent means with which 
they have been implemented have had a profound impact upon the historical memories of today’s 
South Africans. For South Africa’s black youth, the legacy of apartheid’s “separate development” 
has been one of persistent socioeconomic inequality, high unemployment, and unequal access to 
education.
 Apartheid.
 The roots of apartheid derive from Dutch colonization in the seventeenth century and 
British colonial domination from the early nineteenth century. Colonial rule was established 
through the violent destruction of African societies and their subjugation under the country’s 
capitalist economy, maintained through economic exploitation on the basis of racial segregation. 
This system of racial segregation was predicated upon the political dominance of whites, both 
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English-speaking and Afrikaners, while political rights and representation were simultaneously 
denied to non-whites.
 Segregationist policies turned Africans into a cheap labor force employed first in 
European-controlled agriculture, then from the late nineteenth century, in the country’s 
burgeoning, white-owned mining industry and manufacturing sector (Thompson 2001: 121). 
African men migrated from rural areas to work in the mines for months at a time, earning nearly 
eight times less than the average white worker (Thompson 2001: 121). They suffered from 
terrible working and living conditions and were forbidden from organizing, unlike white 
workers, who effectively appealed to racial protections from the government to establish their 
privileged position in skilled jobs (Thompson 2001: 121). These economically exploitative 
practices on the basis of race would form the foundation for apartheid-era policies, formally 
initiated with the rise to power of the National Party in 1948.
 A cornerstone of these policies were laws that denied political rights to Africans and 
confined their property and residence rights to rural “homelands,” poor and overcrowded 
territories whose predecessors were already established with the 1927 Native Administration Act 
(Clark and Worger 2004: 22). As Clark and Worger (2004: 22) write: “The rural areas quickly 
became unable to support the African population and as people sought to work elsewhere they 
were forced into a system of migrant labour, moving between workplaces where they had no 
rights, back to rural homes were they could not survive.” When working in the cities, legally 
defined as “white” South Africans, most African workers were required to carry passes, limiting 
their movements and binding them to their place of employment. It was in this context of 
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coercive control of the black majority by the white minority that organized opposition to 
segregation and socioeconomic oppression developed.
 The Afrikaner-controlled National Party took power in 1948 with a minority of the votes 
but a majority of the parliamentary seats, promising that Africans would “develop along their 
own lines in their true fatherland, the [segregated] Reserves” (cited in Clark and Worger 2004: 
42). The policies enacted by the National Party over the next decade reinforced the system of 
racial segregation in the name of a political program of “apartheid” (Clark and Worger 2004: 3, 
4). Under apartheid legislation, individuals were classified racially through arbitrary tests as 
either white, coloured, ‘asiatic’ (Indian), or ‘native’ (‘Bantu’ or African), and such classification 
on a racial basis determined rights to residence, marriage, political representation, employment, 
education, and use of all public facilities, including transport, cinemas, restaurants, and even 
beaches (Worden 2007: 106).
 Organized resistance to apartheid and state intransigency.
 During the 1950‘s these policies were met with resistance from African organizations, 
especially with the African National Congress’s and the Communist Party’s joint Defiance 
Campaign, the Federation of South African women’s anti-pass campaign, bus boycotts, worker’s 
strikes and attacks on local ‘chiefs’ in rural areas (Worden 2007: 110-112). Nevertheless, the 
anti-apartheid movement was divided among those who supported the ANC’s ‘Freedom Charter’ 
advocating equal rights for blacks, whites, Indians, and coloureds in a new democratic South 
Africa and those who favored an ‘Africa for Africans’ philosophy proposed by the Pan Africanist 
Congress (Worden 2007: 116-117). 
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 On March 21st, 1960, police fired upon a crowd of peaceful demonstrators protesting 
against the pass laws, killing sixty-nine and wounding more than a hundred people (Worden 
2007: 118). The ‘Sharpeville massacre,’ as it came to be known, generated international 
condemnation and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa (Worden 2007: 
118). The apartheid regime remained undeterred, instituting a state of emergency banning the 
ANC and the PAC, as well as detaining and imprisoning key resistance leaders (Worden 2007: 
118-119). Although both the ANC and PAC embarked on an armed campaign, their status as 
illegal, clandestine organizations left a vacuum in nonviolent resistance politics until the 1970’s 
(Worden 2007: 127-128). 
 In the early 1970’s, it was South Africa’s youth who took up the mantle of resistance. 
Following widespread worker strikes from 1973 to 1976, 15,000 students in the township of 
Soweto in Johannesburg staged a protest against the imposition of Afrikaans as a language 
medium of instruction in their schools (Worden 2007: 130-131). After the police fired on the 
crowd of demonstrators, killing several students, widespread riots and school boycotts spread 
across South Africa’s townships (Worden 2007: 131). This radicalization of African youth 
galvanized the erstwhile dormant resistance, even as police brutality and detention without trial 
continued (Clark and Worger 2004: 77-78).
 The regime intended to appease the masses by granting limited rights and socioeconomic 
improvements for non-whites, but these partial reforms did not go so far as to provide political 
representation to the African majority (Clark and Worger 2004: 82). Recognizing that these 
‘changes’ were merely a continuation of the status quo of apartheid, the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) was formed in 1983 to mobilize to end the racist regime (Clark and Worger 2004: 85). 
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The organization adhered to the basic ideals of the ANC’s Freedom Charter and drew vast 
popular support (Clark and Worger 2004: 84). The apartheid regime declared another State of 
Emergency in July of 1985, as the ANC, the UDF and black trade unions fought to ‘render the 
country ungovernable’ (Clark and Worger 2004: 95).
 Escalation of youth violence in South Africa.
 The struggle to end apartheid reached its apex in 1985, as during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, South Africa’s youth were directly involved in violent sociopolitical confrontation which 
placed further pressure on the apartheid regime to address dissidence through stricter law 
enforcement and hesitant alliances with black leaders. Township youth became mobilized 
through the Azanian Student’s Organization (ASO) and the Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS), both affiliates of the UDF, and began boycotting schools with the 1985 slogan 
‘liberation now, education later’ (Dlamini 2005: 70). 
 Militant youths commenced toyi-toying in the streets, and in what came to be known as 
the ‘comrades movement’ many of these youth became comrades in arms with the ANC (Beinart 
2001: 259). These ‘comrades’ established popular courts, punishing informers by ‘necklacing,’ or 
lighting fire to a gasoline-soaked tire placed around the accused’s neck and also killed those 
whom local ngakas (diviners) identified as practicing witches (Beinart 2001: 261). While the 
violent political mobilization of South Africa’s youth was often nominally in support of anti-
apartheid organizations, it nonetheless also threatened to destabilize and divide the leadership of 
these organizations, who argued that they could not longer contain destructive tendencies of their 
youthful supporters.  
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 Further, in addition to youth violence perpetrated in the name of resistance to apartheid 
oppression, many militarized youths subverted support for the ANC and UDF through their 
involvement with the Inkatha Youth League. The Inkatha Youth League was associated with 
Mangosuthu Butulezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a Zulu-based political party covertly 
supported by the apartheid regime and presented as an alternative to the ANC (Beinart 2001: 
267). The Inkatha Freedom Party sought greater political representation within the apartheid 
state, opposing armed struggle to end the apartheid regime, sanctions and socialism (Beinart 
2001: 267). 
 Ideological differences between the IFP contra the ANC and UDF descended into 
violence as impis (Inkatha youth brigades) wielding traditional Zulu weapons and amaqabase 
(comrades) clashed in the peri-urban settlements around Pietermartizburg (Beinart 2001: 267). 
Forbidden by the IFP from participating in school boycotts, and angered by amaqabane policies 
of destroying and looting ‘government-owned’ property (often actually owned by residents), 
Inkatha youths often attacked or prosecuted UDF student demonstrators (Dlamini 70-71). The 
situation in South Africa rapidly deteriorated in the early 1990s as, in addition to this internal 
unrest, the United States imposed political and economic sanctions on the apartheid regime 
(Clark and Worger 2004: 95). 
 Collapse of apartheid regime and democratic elections. 
 Confronting sharp criticism from international anti-apartheid movements and internal 
resistance organizations, the new administration of President F.W. De Klerk lifted, in February 
1990, the ban on the PAC, the ANC and other organizations and released Nelson Mandela, leader 
of the ANC, from prison (Clark and Worger 2004: 103). Negotiations for a democratic transition 
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took place between the ANC and NP government throughout 1993 and early 1994 amidst 
continued violence which lasted practically up until the week of the first national elections of 
April, 1994 (Clark and Worger 2004: 109). About ninety percent of registered voters cast their 
ballots in four days of national elections and on May 9th, 1994, Nelson Mandela became the first  
democratically elected president of South Africa (Clark and Worger 2004: 110).
 Youth in post-apartheid South Africa.
 After apartheid, South Africa has continued to face numerous challenges in its efforts to 
build an inclusive multi-racial democracy. Not least of these are its high unemployment rates of 
over thirty percent, the second worst socioeconomic inequality in the world (behind Brazil), 
corruption at the state level, high crime rates, poor educational performance, and the rise of 
gangsterism and drug trafficking (Worden 2007: 162-163). It is in this context that many of 
today’s youth in South Africa are being stereotyped as a ‘lost generation’ without purpose or 
opportunity, but socialized to violent behavior.
Northern Ireland
 Similarly, in the recent history of Northern Ireland there has also been considerable and 
recurring public concern that young people growing up in contexts of political conflict would 
develop into ‘children of violence,’ acting out the tensions and antagonisms of their parents’ 
generation. As Byrne (1997: 23) argues: “Children’s political awareness and inclinations towards 
conflict and political authority have a historical and cultural basis....It is important to trace the 
historical forces separating [Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland] if we are to 
understand the political world Northern Irish children experience, feel, and absorb.” Although 
the heightened period of violent political conflict in Northern Ireland, known as “The Troubles,” 
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occurred from 1969 to 1996, these ‘historical forces’ date back to the experience of British 
colonization of the island.
 Colonization and partition.
 Discriminatory laws denying property rights, educational access, and employment to 
Catholics, Methodists and Presbyterians were introduced by the end of the seventeenth century 
(Byrne 1997: 28 and Coogan 1996: 6). During the nineteenth century, in a context of economic 
decline heightened by the potato famine of the 1840s, Catholic and Protestant movements grew 
polarized around issues of land reform and the proposed introduction by the British government 
of a “home rule” system for Ireland, which the Protestant elites of the northern parts of the island 
opposed in the name of union with Britain (Byrne 1997: 29-31). Then, in the Easter Week of 
1916, the Irish Republican Brotherhood reorganized and staged an uprising in Dublin to end 
British rule over the island of Ireland and institute an independent Irish Republic (Coogan 1996: 
19). 
 Pressured by the Irish Republican Brotherhood, now renamed the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), the British attempted to appease Protestant Unionist interests in Belfast and Catholic 
nationalist demands in Dublin with the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 (Coogan 1996: 20). 
This Act divided the territory between the six Protestant Unionist counties of the North and the 
twenty-six counties in the heavily Catholic South and West (Byrne 1997: 34). While ostensibly 
the South became the ‘Irish Free State,’ the fact that it remained a dominion of the United 
Kingdom was unacceptable to young IRA members who had pledged to fight for an independent 
Irish republic (Coogan 1996: 21).
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 A brutal civil war followed until 1923 in which former allies in the struggle for Irish 
independence turned against one another to fight the implementation of the Act (Coogan 1996: 
21). Neverthless, the Act and the boundary it represented remained intact, leaving a substantial 
Catholic minority in the newly-formed Northern Ireland under the rule of a ‘Protestant 
parliament for a Protestant people’ (Coogan 1996: 22-23).
 Protestant ascendancy and discrimination.
 Fearful of a hostile Catholic minority and frustrated by a noncommittal British 
government, the Protestant Ulster Unionist Party believed that consolidating unionist power and 
identity was the only means to secure the survival of the Northern Irish state (McKittrick and 
McVea 2002: 6-7). In 1922, proportional representation was abolished first at the local level and 
then in elections to national parliament, further restricting the political representation of the 
Catholic nationalist community (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 8-9). Confronted with 
discrimination in public and private sector employment, disproportionate allocation of public 
housing to Protestants, restriction of voting rights to the head of household and oppression by an 
exclusively Protestant police force, Catholics felt increasingly marginalized from public life 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 9-13).
 In 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) formed to protest the 
mistreatment of Catholics in Northern Ireland (Byrne 1997: 40). Styling itself after the American 
civil rights movement and student movements across Europe, NICRA, the product of a 
burgeoning Catholic middle-class unwilling to accept their status as second-class citizens, 
espoused non-violent resistance (Byrne 1997: 40-41). On October 5th 1968, following a ban by 
the Minister for Home Affairs, the NICRA staged a march in Londonderry (McKittrick and 
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McVea 2002: 41). The documented and televised brutality of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
against the marchers brought international attention to the situation in Northern Ireland and put 
pressure on the government to institute reform (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 41-42).
 Escalation of violence and the beginning of ‘The Troubles.’
 Thwarting the possibilities of reform stood the loyalists of the Ulster Volunteer force and 
other Protestant unionist organizations whose intransigence led by the late 1960s to a climate of 
violence and intimidation (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 47-49). Catholics in Northern Ireland 
felt increasingly abandoned by an Irish Republican Army under Southern, leftist leadership 
which seemed unable to protect them (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 59-60). A split within the 
IRA brought into being the Provisional IRA, committed to defending the nationalist community 
in Northern Ireland and achieving a united Irish Republic through armed struggle. These 
developments signaled a steady increase in the level of violence in Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s.
 1972 marked the height of violence during ‘the Troubles,’ which would last until the 
signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in 1998. On the infamous ‘Bloody Sunday,’ 
fourteen unarmed demonstrators were shot (many in the back) when the British Parachute 
Regiment opened fire on civil rights marchers in Derry (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 76). In 
response, the IRA stepped up its bombing campaign, while loyalist paramilitary organizations 
retaliated by shooting Catholic civilians (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 86). 
 Youth participation during ‘The Troubles’.
 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, young people were often involved in civil rights 
demonstrations, constituting a significant proportion of those injured or fatally wounded (Cairns 
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1987: 26). In fact, in a 1980 Mercer study estimated that about one-third of all young people in 
Northern Ireland had participated in a demonstration (Cairns 1987: 27). Further, Northern Irish 
youth as young as ten years old were frequently associated with violent rioting against security 
forces and were reputed to have been involved in burning homes and intimidating residents of 
the opposing community (Cairns 1987: 27).
 The shift from violent confrontation associated with civil rights demonstrations to armed 
struggle and bombing campaigns did not signal the end of the youth’s direct participation in the 
conflict (Cairns 1987: 28). Rather, in addition to being utilized in an auxiliary capacity, providing 
diversions which allowed gunmen to escape the detection of security forces, they were also used 
occasionally as human shields (Cairns 1987: 28). Youth were even recruited by local 
paramilitaries and also may have been taught to make and deploy petrol bombs (Cairns 1987: 
28). The youth’s direct involvement in paramilitary violence appears to have peaked in 1978, 
when nearly one hundred young people from ages ten to seventeen were charged with firearms 
and explosives-related offenses, with arrests dropping to around twenty-five annually throughout 
the remainder of the Troubles (Cairns 1987: 29).
 During the 1980s, one youth in particular constituted arguably the most enduring popular 
symbol of the Troubles. Since 1976, a dispute had been developing in Northern Ireland’s prisons, 
also known as the ‘H-blocks,’ surrounding the issue of ‘special category status’ being granted to 
republican and loyalist paramilitary prisoners (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 137). Prior to 1976, 
republican and loyalist paramilitary internees were allowed free association and were permitted 
to wear their own clothes and to accept visits and packages, obeying their commanders’ 
instructions rather than those of the prison wardens or guards (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 
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138). With the revocation of these privileges and the effective criminalization of loyalist and 
republican paramilitary internees, prisoners began increasingly to protest their change of status, 
first by refusing to wear their prison uniforms, then by refusing to bathe, and finally, by refusing 
to eat (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 138-141). 
 In 1981, IRA and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) prisoners went on a second 
‘hungerstrike,’ with a young, charismatic Bobby Sands being the first to refuse to eat prison food 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 142). Met with the British state’s rigidity and aversion to 
compromise, ten prisoners died of slow starvation, the first being the twenty-seven-year-old 
Bobby Sands (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 142-144). Sands’ youthful persona and media-
friendly image made him a ready martyr for the republican cause. His story resonated with young 
people worldwide, who pledged their support for the nationalist armed struggle. In Northern 
Ireland, this led to a dramatic increase in public sympathy for the IRA and a swell in its ranks 
with supporters acknowledging that “it is not those who inflict the most who ultimately win, but 
those who endure the most” (cited in McKittrick and McVea 2002: 146).    
 The peace process.
 Britain and Ireland negotiated the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, an initiative to 
strengthen constitutional nationalism (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 163). This historic Act 
contended that a change in Northern Ireland’s status could only result from a majority vote by its 
people (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 163). However, the agreement did not produce the 
substantial change desired by nationalists and merely consolidated unionists’ interests 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 169). Violence continued even as Northern Ireland began to move 
towards a political settlement by the early 1990s. 
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 The historic ‘Good Friday Agreement’ of April 10th, 1998 provided for cross-border 
relationships between both Northern Ireland and Ireland and Northern Ireland and Britain, 
parliamentary rule in Northern Ireland, and a commitment to leave the decision to remain a part 
of the United Kingdom or join a united Ireland to the consent of the people of Northern Ireland 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 220). On May 22nd, in both the North and South, separate 
referendums were held, which resulted in overwhelming majority support for the Good Friday 
Agreement from the Republic and a seventy-one percent approval rating from the North 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 222). While sectarian violence continued, the peace process 
essentially stayed on track, and the IRA was officially decommissioned in 2005.
 Youth in post-conflict Northern Ireland.
 Young people had played an important role throughout the Troubles, particularly in their 
participation in civil rights demonstrations, riots, and formal or informal membership in 
paramilitary organizations (Cairns 1987: 26-29). Since the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement, young people have faced numerous challenges in the struggle to build a peaceful 
society in the wake of the region’s prolonged period of sectarian violence. These challenges 
included continued spatial and communal segregation (especially in Belfast), violence against 
ethnic minorities, and failure to provide socioeconomic opportunities, especially in working class 
communities (Coulter and Murray 2008: 16-17). Poverty rates in working-class loyalist 
neighborhoods keep rising, and “the substantial and multiple disadvantage which they face has 
inevitably served to alienate many working-class unionists from a peace process which they 
consider to have conferred benefit from others but not upon them” (Coulter and Murray 2008: 
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18). This has led many to conjecture that the next generation of violent political extremism will 
emerge from these working-class areas (Coulter and Murray 2008: 18).
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Literature Review
 Scholarly literature on youth and violence has overwhelmingly concerned itself with 
debating the root causes, or etiology, of violent behavior among young people. One of the first 
concerns in studying youth violence is that professionals in different fields apply varying 
terminology to describe the same deviant or violent youth behavior (Leone  1990: 16). For 
example, a young individual who commits acts of violence may be alternately described by 
general educators as ‘disruptive,’ special educators as having a ‘serious emotional disorder,’ 
correction officers as ‘delinquent’ and clinicians as ‘having oppositional deviant disorder’ (Leone 
1990: 16). These labels often convey negative connotations and the lack of consistency in their 
implementation can impede communication across disciplines (Leone 1990: 16).
Defining Youth Violence
 So, what exactly do we mean by the term ‘youth violence?’ The National Academy of 
Sciences Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior offers simply, “Youth 
violence is defined as interpersonal violence committed against children and adolescents below 
the legal age of adulthood,” or ‘behavior by persons against persons that intentionally threatens, 
attempts, or actually inflicts physical harm” (cited in Howard and Jenson 1999: 7). The National 
Academy of Sciences Panel definition is restrictive, in the sense that it equates ‘youth’ with a 
legal minority status, restricts ‘violence’ to physical, personal harm, and limits ‘youth violence’ 
to violence committed against youth, rather than committed by youth. 
 Füsun Çetin offers an alternative, more precise definition, stating, youth violence is “any 
intentional physical, sexual or psychological assault on another person (or persons) by one or 
more young people aged 12 to 24 years” (Çetin 2008: 11). By specifying an age range of 
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between 12 to 24 years, Çetin’s explanation describes ‘youth’ not as merely a legal category, but 
one which can be applied socially long after attained the age of legal majority. Further, Çetin’s 
definition includes both sexual and psychological forms of violence, as opposed to simply 
physical interpersonal conflict.
 While Çetin’s definition of youth violence identifies both the actors and types of youth 
violence, it does not expound on why youth violence must be ‘intentional,’ how such intent 
should be determined, or what potential motivations for youth to act violently might be. The idea 
of intent is especially pertinent to our study as we will be examining current significations for 
youth violence in post-conflict contexts where violence has historically been politically 
motivated. Fidan Owen defines political violence as, “violence enacted against persons or 
property to achieve certain political ends” (Owen 2008: 24). Thus, Owen’s definition 
incorporates violence against property and also rejects the idea of universalist norms demarcating 
violent and nonviolent behavior by arguing for a culturally-appropriate definition of violence 
which recognizes that identifying aggressive behaviors depends upon what is considered 
culturally illegitimate (Owen 2008: 28). For our purposes, we will incorporate the merits of both 
Çetin’s and Owen’s arguments to define youth violence as “intentional physical, or psychological 
acts considered aggressive, according to prevalent cultural assumptions, against other persons or 
property, committed by young people aged 12 to 24 years.” 
Etiology of Youth Violence
 In his book Understanding Troubled and Troubling Youth, Peter Leone divides the 
theoretical arguments of different scholars into three categories, or micro, meso and macro 
perspectives. A micro, or problem/person-centered perspective focuses directly on youth 
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exhibiting ‘problem behaviors’ and employs strategies to correct or suppress these behaviors 
(Leone 1990: 18). This perspective is individualistic in nature and argues that ‘problem youths’ 
have simply not learned normative, adaptive, and prosocial behaviors (Leone 1990: 18). 
 The meso, or social ecological perspective examines the wider social context in which 
these ‘problem behaviors’ occur, contesting that youth deviance is a result of an imbalance in the 
relationship or social interactions between youth and their environments (Leone 1990: 19). 
Societal behavior, as well as youth behavior, may be maladaptive (Leone 1990: 19). Thus, 
change is the responsibility of both the youth and members of his or her social environment 
(Leone 1990: 19). 
 A macro, structural-level or cultural-level analysis considers the “institutions, culture and 
other societal forces that give meaning to daily events and influence behavior” (Leone 1990: 19). 
According to a macro-perspective of youth violence, “troubling behavior can be seen as a 
function of the roles that adolescents play in society and the unanticipated purposes that deviant 
behaviors serve” (Leone 1990: 19). Thus, behaviors which would be maladaptive in certain 
contexts, such as youth violence, may be adaptive to counteract systemic social problems (Leone 
1990: 19). For example, our results indicate that to counteract unequal access to higher education 
in South Africa, some youth join gangs in order to attain social status and achieve financial 
security. In this context, youth violence can be perceived as an adaptive response, given the 
systemic social problem of unequal educational access.
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 Micro-perspective.
 Let us first evaluate the merits and limitations of a micro-perspective on youth violence, 
which explains violent behavior among young people through the presence of individual 
qualities or factors. 
 Violent youths match specific population indicators.
 Many who adopt a micro-perspective on youth violence will begin by examining 
population indicators such as gender, age, and race or ethnicity to explain why some youths 
exhibit aggressive behaviors. Research on population indicators has concluded that young violent  
offenders are internationally an overwhelmingly male phenomenon, concentrated among ethnic 
‘minorities’ aged fifteen to twenty-five (Howard and Jenson 1999: 22-25). In South Africa, gang 
violence has historically been associated with black urban youth, and has often been regarded as 
the manifestation of an otherwise repressed masculinity, often exerted through sexual violence 
(Pinnock 1996: 29; Glaser 2000: 4) Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s “subculture of violence” thesis 
goes so far as to say that the disproportionate level of violent offenders within ethnic minority 
populations is the result of their inherently violent culture (see Guerra and Smith 2006: 21). 
 While a micro-level approach of studying population indicators may yield 
information pointing at the prevalence of violence in potentially vulnerable populations, this 
perspective minimizes structural or systemic factors and the influence of socio-ecological niches 
on adaptive cultural beliefs and practices (Guerra and Smith 2006: 21). Studies, such as the 
research conducted by Krivo and Peterson in the 1990’s, show that when structural conditions 
are controlled, violence rates are comparable across communities (Guerra and Smith 2006: 24). 
However, “most prevalent conceptual frameworks do not emphasize the social stratification 
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system or the social positions that comprise...the structure of the system and the processes and 
consequences that these relative positions engender for a child’s development” (cited in Guerra 
and Smith 2006: 26). 
 While micro-level factors often appear to present a tidy explanation of youth violence, 
they generally fail to consider the interrelated nature of individual characteristics and the social 
environment. For example, Kanarek’s 1994 study shows that an individual sugar-rich diet is 
correlated with hyperactive behavior, poor school performance, possible emotional 
maladjustment and juvenile delinquency (Howard and Jenson 1999: 26-27; Bynum and 
Thompson 1995: 113). By blaming sugar consumption, however, this approach ignores social 
and institutional factors such as the impact of the school system on school performance (Bynum 
and Thompson 1995: 145).
 Violent youths fit a psychological type.
 Psychological or psychogenic theory is perhaps the most pervasive perspective within the 
micro-perspective on youth violence. It is generally rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis and 
explains youth violence as the output of the repressed, unconscious traumas of childhood 
(Bynum and Thompson 1995: 125). According to a psychogenic perspective, delinquent acts are 
symptoms of a psychopathology, an “internal neurological disorder, or deeply hidden personality 
disturbance,” rather than learned behavior or the outcome of marginalization (Bynum and 
Thompson 1995: 129). As a result, studies like Theodore Ferdinand’s in 1966, have endeavored 
to establish a psychological typology of criminals, while others point to qualities such as early 
aggressiveness, negative emotionality in childhood, and left-hemisphere language deficits as 
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predictive of later youth violence (Howard and Jenson 1999: 27-28, Bynum and Thompson 
1995: 136). 
 However, no such criminal personality type been identified (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 
137). In fact, it is highly improbable that a unique delinquent psychological type exists, as 
delinquent acts are usually committed by ordinary people, for which an abnormal psychological 
pathology cannot be ascertained (Klein 1987). Research conducted by Burgess and Ferguson on 
young people’s reasons for joining paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland shows that they 
resulted from rational decision-making, rather than “psychological disorders that make them 
capable of committing murderous atrocities” (Burgess and Ferguson 2008: 83-86). 
 Furthermore, adult behaviors relate not only to childhood experiences but evolve 
according to processes of human development in which one adopts a variety of social roles and 
adapts to a variety of social situations (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 146). This is why Cairns, in 
his important work on young people and violence in Northern Ireland, argues that developmental 
psychology cannot be divorced from the social context of political violence (Cairns 1987: 673).
 Meso or social ecological perspective.
 A meso, or social ecological perspective on youth violence provides a framework to 
understand this phenomenon within its social context, and design interventions that focus on the 
transaction between individuals and their environments, rather than merely individual 
characteristics (Trickett and Zlotlow 1990: 105). “Rather than being portrayed as a relatively 
indifferent force with which individuals must contend, the ecological environment consists of 
specific processes, norms and structures that exert active influence on the individual” (Trickett 
and Zlotlow 1990: 106). In examining ecological processes, Kelly describes deviance as the 
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result of the interplay between the adaptive demands of the sociocultural setting and the adaptive 
capacities of individuals (Trickett and Zlotlow 1990: 106). Thus, behavior which is adaptive in 
one setting may be maladaptive in others (Trickett and Zlotlow 1990: 106).
 Youths become violent as a result of marginalization.
 Social ecological explanations for youth violence abound. Some theories focus on the 
role of socioeconomic marginalization in producing violent youths. The “Social Strain Theory” 
or “Anomie Theory” posits that, given unstable social conditions, there is a “state of 
dissatisfaction arising from a sense of discrepancy between the aspirations of the individual and 
the means that person has available to realize these ambitions” (Merton 1938: 672-682). Each 
individual has a differential opportunity to pursue success through both legitimate and 
illegitimate means (Cloward and Ohlin 1960). With lack of available means to realize one’s 
ambitions, an individual, if given the opportunity, may resort to deviant behavior (Merton 1938: 
672-682). The inconsistency between the expectations of South African youth and the pace of 
sociopolitical change in South Africa has, for example, often been linked to youth violence 
(Hirshowitz, et. al. 1994: 81).
 Inherent to Social Strain Theory is the assumption that lower-class and middle-class 
individuals share the same socioeconomic aspirations and internalize the same meaning of 
success (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 161). However, studies such as Hans’ 1969 research 
indicate that members of the impoverished social class adjust their expectations according to 
their economic situation (Hans 1969: 679-790). Furthermore, Social Strain Theory assumes a 
correlation between poverty and youth violence, a correlation which has never been conclusively 
established and varies tremendously depending upon the type of violent behavior studied 
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(Howard and Jenson 1999: 25). Social Strain Theory still does not explain why youth violence is 
concentrated among males, even within impoverished communities or why young people appear 
to abandon delinquent behavior as they grow older, despite the persistence of adverse 
environmental factors (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 161). Clearly, being poor does not 
necessarily equal acting violently.
 Youths are socialized to violence within violent environments.
 Other scholars in this perspective contest that youth violence is simply another learned 
behavior in impoverished communities. Cultural Transmission theorists insist that delinquency is 
a product of youth internalizing the norms and values of a lower-class subculture (Bynum and 
Thompson 1995: 166). Miller’s 1958 study of lower class culture, for example, contends that 
delinquency is a result of commitment to lower-class values, such as exhibiting one’s 
masculinity, demonstrating street smartness, and striving for autonomy from authorities (Miller 
1958: 5-19). 
 Social Learning Theories, likewise contend that juvenile delinquency is a learned 
behavior apprehended through interactions with criminal elements of society (Bynum and 
Thompson 1995: 173). Sutherland and Cressey’s 1943 argument on ‘differential association,’ as 
well as Akers’ 1985 ‘differential reinforcement’ theory suggest that delinquent or violent 
behavior among youths is a reflection of their association with a criminal tradition which rewards 
and reinforces maladaptive behaviors (Sutherland and Cressey 1943 and Akers 1985). In South 
Africa, in particular, there has been concern that young people will adopt maladaptive behavior 
as they “have been socialized to find violence completely acceptable and human life 
cheap” (Chikane 1990: 344). Fraser likewise argued that among youth in Northern Ireland, “The 
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violence that children learn in the streets spills over...towards all authority figures. Once you are 
patterned to violence, it is hard to get unpatterned” (cited in Cairns 1983: 120). Basically, “a 
person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over 
definitions unfavorable to violation of law” (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 173). 
 The argument that youth violence is merely the product of socialization in a criminal 
value system contains numerous fallacies. First, so-called ‘high delinquency areas’ may be 
‘collectors’ rather than ‘generators’ of violent behavior, due to societal rejection or previous 
identification with delinquent behavior (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 172). Second, official 
statistics are often a reflection of law enforcement bias in impoverished areas and even in ‘high 
delinquency areas’ there remain many young people who do not engage in delinquent behavior 
(Bynum and Thompson 1995: 171, 177). Finally, as David Matza’s 1964 study shows, far from 
giving support or condoning the violent behavior of their peers, many deviants view youth 
violence as morally wrong (Matza 1964). Thus, social ecological theories which regard youth 
violence as a product of learned behavior through cultural association or interpersonal 
relationships ignore the power young people have to shape their own process of socialization or 
assign meanings to their environment. 
 Youth are violent because society labels them as such.
 However, some social ecological approaches do consider the role of meaning and identity 
construction in generating youth violence. For example, Labeling Theories argue that youths 
assume a deviant role in response to societal reactions to their behavior. Tannenbaum’s 1938 
‘Tagging’ theory contends that the treatment of the offender is what translates an occasional 
criminal into a hardened criminal (Tannenbaum 1938: 8-22). As Becker, contends in his The 
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Outsiders, “No act is intrinsically deviant, but must be defined as such” (Becker 1963). Labeling 
a person as generally, rather than specifically deviant, causes them to adopt a ‘master status’ of 
delinquency (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 199).
 While Labeling Theory implicates society as responsible for perpetuating youth violence, 
it provides no insight into what causes youth deviance in the first place, or what compels one 
individual over another to commit deviant acts (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 201). Also, in 
practice, treating delinquent youths harshly has not been associated with greater criminality 
(Bynum and Thompson 1995: 202). Rather, Thornberry’s 1979 study shows that many potential 
second offenders are deterred by decisive reactions to their first offense (Thornberry 1979). 
Finally, Labeling Theory assumes that societal reactions are completely external to the actor and 
that individuals cannot create a delinquent label (Bynum and Thompson 1995: 202). Overall, 
Labeling Theories regard youth violence as being generated from external manipulation by adult 
members of society, and neglects to incorporate the capacity for individual choice and youth 
agency. 
 Macro-perspective.
 Youth become violent to resist economic exploitation by elite adults.
 Similarly, within macro-perspectives on youth violence focusing on structural or systemic 
conditions, Radical Theory considers society’s role in labeling, and thereby, determining 
delinquent behaviors. Influenced by Marxist theory, radical theory contends that conflict between 
the interests and values of different social classes produces a delinquent label which is in turn, 
upheld by differential law enforcement applied to these social classes (Bynum and Thompson 
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1995: 204). Quinney’s 1975 ‘social reality of crime’ contends that acts which threaten privileged 
classes are more easily stigmatized by law and labeled delinquent (Quinney 1975). 
 In this perspective, therefore, activities or conduct most threatening to adults, who hold 
both economic and social power would be most likely defined as delinquent and punished. To 
this would contribute a young person’s status as socially and economically inferior to his peers 
and his parents, which would further restrict youth’s opportunities for economic advancement 
(Greenburg 1979: 189-224). Thus, youth are frustrated by their relegation to unfulfilled age-
status roles and would resort to crime to survive and resist the oppression of powerful adults 
(Quinney 1975).
 Radical Theory goes further than Labeling Theory in considering some of the systemic 
and structural causes behind initial youth violence. However, it overemphasizes the importance 
of socioeconomic factors in predicting youth violence. If youth violence were a manifestation of 
a frustrated juvenile lower class, we would expect it targeting predominately more privileged 
youths, or empowered adults. Yet, much youth violence takes place within the same 
socioeconomic class, rather than being directed at the upper classes (Bynum and Thompson 
1995: 211).
 Moreover, Radical Theory again overemphasizes ‘empowered’ adults as responsible in 
initiating and maintaining youth violence, confining the agency of the youth to merely 
responding to oppression, rather than proactively using violence to attain other goals. Youth 
violence should be seen not simply as a resistance of last resort, but also as a “social currency” to 
navigate social contexts of adversity (Guerra and Smith 2006: 28).
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Towards A New Etiological Paradigm
 Risk and resilience perspective.
 Resilient youths counteract the risks of a violent social ecological environment.
 In this manner, a ‘Risk and Resilience Orientation‘ to youth violence emphasizes the 
actor’s capacity to successfully cope despite a social context of adversity (Richman and Fraser 
2001: 1). It considers the “interplay between a combination of factors predictive of negative 
developmental outcomes (risk factors)” and “combinations of counteracting factors that reduce 
or ameliorate risk (protective factors)” (Richman and Fraser 2001: 1). Resilience is not simply an 
individual trait, but a product of the transaction between an individual and his or her available 
resources. Fraser et. al. posit that “a child who maximally exploits resources - or simply benefits 
from them without considered strategy - and in so doing produces a successful outcome in the 
face of significant threat can be called resilient” (cited in Richman and Fraser 2001: 5).
 However, some argue that by emphasizing the power of young people to overcome 
adversity, we neglect “the very real psychological distress that occurs in the context of 
violence” (cited in Cairns 1994: 679). Further, many studies from a risk and resilience 
perspective result in ‘laundry lists’ of predictive factors, without considering the interrelated 
nature of these factors or differences between particular socioecological settings (Howard and 
Jenson 1999: 21). My earlier discussion of social ecological perspectives on youth violence 
indicates that individual behavior is not an abstract function of individual capacities for 
resilience, but varies from setting to setting (Trickett and Zlotlow 1990: 118-119).  
 Most importantly, scholars of the “risk and resilience” persuasion do not consider youth 
violence a resilient behavior. Rather, it is one’s capacity to resist or abstain from violence which 
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is deemed successful, or resilient. This normative approach does not, therefore, allow one to see 
how, even when acting violently, young people are involved in changing their community and its 
social relationships (Hoffman 2004: 241). Youth possess, in particular, an abundance of social 
capital and vibrant informal networks which are not always approved by society at large but can 
nonetheless be mobilized to navigate the social environment (Hoffman 2004: 241). Youth 
violence can, therefore, be seen as both a resilient and adaptive behavior, even when it is not 
morally approved.
Conceptual Framework of This Study
 Youth agency perspective.
 In contrast to the dominant paradigm on childhood which proposes that children are 
merely passive recipients of adult agency, an emerging perspective on the sociology of childhood 
has prioritized the importance of understanding and appreciating children’s agency in its own 
right (James and Prout 2005: 57). “Children are and must be seen as active in the construction 
and determination of their own social lives, the lives of those around them and the societies in 
which they live. Children are not just the passive subjects of social structures and 
processes” (James and Prout 2005: 57). Although it is acknowledged that these social structures 
and processes may place constraints on a child’s capacity to act, this does not render the agency 
of child impotent or invisible (James and Prout 2005: 76).  
 In her study of the political socialization of Palestinian schoolchildren, Habashi notes that 
children and adults equally respond to processes of global structural hegemony and the local 
reproduction of that hegemony: “Children at large are not a separate entity, and it is not the local 
construct that defines them, rather they are the product of the constant contest between local and 
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global” (Habashi 2009: 44). Habashi thus argues against a clear-cut, universally applicable 
distinction between childhood and adulthood, because “this linear perspective does not express 
the interdependence of local resources and the structure of global discourse” (Habashi 2009: 44). 
This is not to imply, by any means, that children are fully independent (Habashi 2009: 44). 
However they are, at least to some extent, capable of harnessing resources made available by 
global and local discourses and as such, autonomous actors in possession of agency.
 Defining youth agency in context.
 As many theoretical traditions emphasize and debate the agency of young people, what 
do we mean by ‘agency?’ In his The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration, Anthony Giddens argues that, “to be a human being is to be a purposive agent, 
who both has reasons for his or her activities and is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon 
these reasons (including lying about them)” (Giddens 1984: 3). This purposive action is a 
process of rationalization rather than a set of discrete intentions, reasons or motives, as 
sociologists have often argued (Giddens 1984, 3, 8). Agency refers not to the actors’ intentions 
but to their capability of action (Giddens 1984: 9). Inherent to Giddens’ definition is the notion 
of power, as determining and distributing capacities to act according to different rationalities and 
goals (Giddens 1984: 9). 
 The association of agency with power is of particular significance for children and young 
adults, traditionally portrayed as ‘silent others,’ ‘enfants terribles,’ a ‘lost generation,’ or 
alternatively, innocent and vulnerable, and thereby in need of adult protection (Honwana 2005: 
3). “Children and youth appear as pre-social and passive recipients of experience. They are 
portrayed as dependent, immature, and incapable of assuming responsibility, properly confined 
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to the protection of home and school” (Honwana 2005: 3). Those children and youth who do 
transgress these established boundaries, or otherwise fail to conform, are labeled 
‘deviants’ (James and Prout 2005: 62). 
 Both in South Africa and Northern Ireland, youth were stereotyped by the media, 
governmental forces, revolutionary movements and scholars as a ‘lost generation’ of 
marginalized persons living outside formal social structures and devoid of the values deemed 
essential for ‘civilized’ society (Seekings 1996: 103, 121). In this perspective, Seekings argues, 
“today’s youth are armed, their violence is anarchic and random, their targets innocent passers-
by” (Seekings 1996: 107).  All of the various political, economic, educational, social and 
psychological dangers of violence in a context of conflict were thus attributed to a single age 
cohort, which in South Africa’s case was often racially identified with black males (Seekings 
1996: 108).
  This stereotype is undoubtedly grounded in the “generally unexamined assumption that 
there is a direct and close relationship between adverse structural conditions, moral degradation, 
and anti-social behavior” (Seekings 1996: 118). Certainly young people in Northern Ireland and 
South Africa faced and continue to face adverse conditions such as unemployment and 
communal violence (Seekings 1996: 123).  Nevertheless, these youth are not just powerless 
victims of circumstances of which their actions are mere reflexes. They should not, therefore, be 
excluded from a category of rational actors in possession of agency.
 Recognizing youth as rational actors.
 In their study of youth in post-colonial Africa, Honwana and De Boek argue for a 
recognition of children and youth as “both makers and breakers of society while they are 
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simultaneously being made and broken by that society” (Honwana and De Boek 2005: 2). While 
I would caution against objectifying youth as either a constructive or destructive force, this 
statement reinforces the importance of focusing on transactions between young people and 
society and emphasizes the youth’s capacity to affect change in ways both legitimized and 
approved by their social context. “Young people in Africa have the capacity to fracture public 
space, and re-invent or even bypass it” (Honwana and De Boek 2005: 1). 
 Furthermore, despite the violence surrounding their everyday lives, young people are 
important sources of economic production, wealth and security in an African family dynamic: 
“Children and youth are major players in the new informal economies and processes of 
globalization,” the development of popular culture, and in “redefining and restructuring existing 
models of kinship and moral matrices of reciprocity and solidarity” (Honwana and De Boek 
2005: 1-2). 
 Similarly, Madeleine Leonard acknowledges the agency and social capital of children and 
young adults in Northern Ireland post-conflict processes. Traditionally, social capital has been 
regarded as a resource earned through a one-way process of socialization between parent and 
child, in which children either reject or accept the norms and values imparted by their parents, 
but do not influence them (Leonard 2005: 607). Social capital is regarded as an asset for a child’s 
future, rather than his or her present, as children are described, to quote Qvortrup ,as ‘human 
becomings’ as opposed to human beings (cited in Leonard 2005: 607).
 Leonard’s research on children’s employment in Northern Ireland, instead, shows that 
young adults do generate and access sources of social capital independently of their parents and 
their parents’ associates, for example by developing links of reciprocity and trust and creating 
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social capital by discovering employment opportunities through their peer networks (Leonard 
2005: 617). This social capital can be transferable to other forms of capital as children develop 
life skills they would not have acquired through formal education and generate finances to 
support continuing education (Leonard 2005: 617).
  Moreover, Leonard argues that children and youth in Northern Ireland are also active in 
building subcultural capital as they spatially navigate and claim ownership of streets and places 
where they can escape adult hegemony (Leonard 2008: 236). Subcultural capital “enables 
children and young people to create social spaces not contaminated by existing adult values and 
cultural norms...develop connections that bestow status on participants [and] reinterpret the 
social world” (Leonard 2008: 237). The way in which this subcultural capital is produced can be, 
I would argue, imbued with various degrees of youth violence, as a form of agency.
 In conclusion, I therefore propose that to fully understand the significance of youth 
violence in post-conflict contexts, one’s focus should not be limited to its undoubtedly painful 
and traumatic aspects, but should look at how, as my findings in Northern Ireland and South 
Africa will show, young people use and signify violence as part of their broader strategies of 
defining themselves as purposive agents in their community and society.
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Methodology
Research Design
 To study how Northern Irish and South African youth understand and employ violence as 
a form of agency, I have employed a qualitative study design consisting of semi-structured 
interviews of no more than forty-five minutes in length. 
 Traditionally, critics have questioned whether the results of qualitative case studies can be 
applied to a broader population. First, some question the significance of these findings, arguing 
that results from qualitative analysis cannot be generalized without further quantitative analysis 
of carefully selected segments of the population (Burawoy 1991, 272). The second line of 
criticism contends that the level of qualitative analysis (face-to-face interaction) is ahistorical, 
ignoring the macro-level, structural conditions of society, and thus, cannot be applied outside of 
its particular setting (Burawoy 1991, 272). 
 Here, we must make the distinction between statistical significance and societal 
significance. When social scientists seek commonalities between similarly selected case studies 
in order to make generalizations about all individuals that possess similar attributes, they are 
searching for statistical significance (Burawoy 1991, 282). This study, however, aspires to 
societal significance. In other words, by analyzing the results of specific interviews, I will 
determine what must be true of their social and historical context for these case studies to “have 
assumed the character we have observed” (Burawoy 1991, 282). Rather than seeking to 
generalize these findings across similar populations, I will use my results to generalize about the 
condition of society at large (Burawoy 1991, 282). Therefore, I will contend that the results of 
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these quantitative case studies are not merely the expressed opinions of sixty-nine individuals, 
but that these findings are societally significant, or representative of a broader social reality.
Data Collection and Analysis
 Study participants were first asked questions to garner information relating to their 
biographical data, socioeconomic status, family composition, education, religious affiliation, and 
ethnic background. Then, I asked respondents to explain their understanding of the term “youth,” 
attending to whether they defined it as an age group, a social status, or a set of attitudes or 
behaviors. Next, I asked respondents to identify the main problems in their communities and to 
suggest possible causes and solutions to these problems. Participants were then asked to 
determine in what situations, if any, violence could be considered justified, as a way to solve 
personal, familial, or community problems. Finally, participants were specifically asked to assess 
the importance of peaceful approaches at the individual and societal level, as an alternative to 
address community and societal problems.
 Interviews were recorded by means of a digital recorder and then transcribed, to ensure 
accuracy and minimize study bias. Results were coded manually and processed using a frame 
analysis approach with which recurring themes in respondents interviews were grouped 
according to: I) an understanding of youth in terms of: A) age, B) physical maturity, C) 
emotional maturity and legal responsibility, and D) a non-existent or irrelevant label; II) 
associations of violence as either: K) unjustifiable or unacceptable, L) morally wrong, but 
socially understandable, or M) a legitimate response to social conditions; and III) identification 
of community problems as related to: E) gender, F) socioeconomic inequality, G) institutional 
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neglect, H) individual failure, I) substance abuse, J) gangsterism and organized crime, N) racism 
and sectarianism, and O) domestic violence and interpersonal violence.
Participants
 This research study is cross-sectional in nature, focusing upon a specific segment of the 
Northern Irish and the South African population, namely youth from deprived communities with 
a past of racial or religious discrimination, histories of violent confrontation, and persistent 
violence in a current, post-conflict context. As such, respondents were recruited by means of an 
oral recruitment script through local non-profit organizations serving at-risk, or disadvantaged 
youth. 
 In Worcester and Oudtshoorn, South Africa, participants were clients of Kibbutz 
Elshamma and the Lappert Street Project, organizations that serve street children, orphans and 
otherwise at-risk youth. In Northern Ireland, respondents were clients of Coiste in Belfast, and 
Tar Abhaile and St. Columb’s Park House in Derry. Coiste and Tar Abahaile are organizations of 
Republican former prisoners that serve youth from predominately nationalist communities. St. 
Columb’s Park House is a reconciliation project targeted to young people throughout Northern 
Ireland. 
 As the research population included minors and individuals from otherwise vulnerable 
populations, special precautions were taken to minimize risk and protect respondents’ right to 
privacy. I was granted initial approval by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for research in 
South Africa in August of 2009, and received approval for Continuing Review from the IRB 
authorizing research in Northern Ireland in August of 2010. In order to ensure that respondents’ 
privacy was protected, I did not access participant records to determine their suitability for the 
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study. Further, personally identifiable information was neither solicited nor recorded at any time 
during the study.  
 Respondents were also appointed an advocate, independent of the research study, who 
was familiar with the respondents and their needs and monitored the recruitment and assent 
processes in order to minimize undue influence. Respondents were not asked to recount personal 
experiences with violence as doing so might have involved unnecessary psychological strain 
associated with evoking past traumas. Finally, participants could terminate their involvement at 
any time during the interview without penalty or damaging their relationship with the affiliated 
non-profit organization. In short, every consideration was taken to ensure that respondents’ 
safety, privacy and well-being would be maintained throughout the course of the study.
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Sample Characteristics
 In total, sixty-nine young people were interviewed across the twenty-three group and 
individual interviews comprising this research study. Of these sixty-nine total respondents, forty-
one were South African and twenty-eight were from Northern Ireland.
Geographical Background
  In South Africa, twenty-eight of the respondents were from Worcester, ten were from 
Oudtshoorn, one was from Kwa-Zulu Natal, one was from Johannesburg, and two were from 
other areas of the Western Cape. Figure 1 shows the number of South African respondents who 
claim residence in each of these cities in order to detail the geographic area represented by the 
results of this study.
  In Northern Ireland, six respondents were from Derry, nine were from Belfast, six were 
from Omagh and the surrounding area, and seven were from Newtownstewart. See Figure 2 for a 
representation of the number of respondents in Northern Ireland who claim residence in each of 
these cities in order to illustrate the geographic area represented by the results of this study.
  As such, 34 percent of all respondents came from rural geographic backgrounds 
(Oudtshoorn, Newtownstewart, and Omagh), while 64 percent came from urban areas (Derry, 
Belfast, Worcester, and Johannesburg).
Gender
 This study aimed to achieve gender balance. In South Africa, thirty-one respondents were 
males, while ten were females. In Northern Ireland, thirteen respondents were males and fifteen 
were females. Overall, 64 percent of all respondents were males, and 36 percent were females.
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Age
 Respondents ranged in ages from 12 to 30 years old. In South Africa, four respondents 
were aged 12 to 14, twenty-eight aged 15 to 18, five aged 19 to 21, and four aged 26 to 30. In 
Northern Ireland, nine respondents were aged 12 to 14, fifteen were aged 15 to 18, two were 
aged 19 to 21, one was 23 years old, and one was 26 years old. By far, most represented age 
bracket was 15 to 18 years old, with 62 percent of all respondents. Figure 3 demonstrates that 
our sample in both Northern Ireland and South Africa is diverse in terms of age.
Ethnic and Religious Affiliation
 In South Africa, the vast majority of respondents, forty, classified themselves ethnically 
or racially as ‘Coloured,’ which reflects the overall demography of the two sites. In Northern 
Ireland, all respondents identified themselves as Roman Catholic. The homogeneity in this 
category can be explained by the nature of the community organizations which assisted with this 
study and the types of communities they serve.
Socioeconomic Background
 While many respondents declined to provide information concerning their socioeconomic 
backgrounds, perhaps as a result of the inherent stigma of associating oneself or one’s family 
with poverty, it is clear that the vast majority of respondents came from relatively deprived 
realities. Of twenty-one South African study participants supplying this information, eight have 
either two unemployed parents or their sole guardian is unemployed. Figure 4 shows that a 
significant percentage of South African respondents’ families are affected by unemployment. 
 In Northern Ireland, thirteen respondents’ families receive financial support from the 
government, compared with two who do not. Figure 5 illustrates that many of the respondents in 
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the sample from Northern Ireland receive some form of federally funded income assistance. 
Further, of fifteen respondents in Northern Ireland describing their families’ occupational status, 
seven have unemployed parents, while for eight at least one guardian was employed. See Figure 
6 which demonstrates that a significant percentage of respondents in Northern Ireland either have 
two unemployed parents or their sole guardian is unemployed.
Family Composition
 Many respondents’ socioeconomic situations are compounded by a lack of a stable family 
structure. This is particularly the case in South Africa, where only twelve of the respondents live 
in two-parent families. Eleven reside in single-parent homes, six live solely with extended family 
members, and thirteen are classified as street children. In Northern Ireland, however, sixteen of 
those interviewed live in a two-parent home, while five live in a single-parent home. None of the 
Northern Irish respondents lived solely with extended family members, or could be classified as 
street children, homeless, or orphans. Overall, of the 91 percent of total respondents who 
answered questions concerning their family structure, 56 percent live outside of a two-parent 
family. See Figure 7 which shows that South African respondents are disproportionately affected 
by a lack of stability in their family structure, the vast majority residing outside of two-parent 
homes.
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Discussion of Comparative Findings from Fieldwork
Youth Defining Youth in Terms of Agency
Scholarly discussions of youth violence seldom address the ambiguities associated with the 
term ‘youth’ itself, especially with regard to the opinions of young people and their own capacity  
for self-identification. Instead, ‘youth’ are often defined and written about by adults. As a result, 
‘youth’ is at risk of becoming merely a stereotype as young people have been granted little space 
to challenge negative perceptions of themselves and their peers. My interviews in South Africa 
and Northern Ireland bridged this gap between young people and youth studies by starting with 
young people’s own capacity to define themselves. 
 Respondents were asked, “What does the word ‘youth’ mean to you?” and “When do 
children become adults?” in addition to follow-up questions which included, “How does a youth/
child/adult act?” For clarity, I have separated responses into the following four categories based 
on the respondent’s identification of “youth” as: 1) an age-grade category; 2) a process of 
physical maturation; 3) a period of emotional maturity or legal responsibility; and 4) an imagined 
but empirically contested label. 
 Youth as an age-grade category.
 Many respondents from both Northern Ireland and South Africa described youth in terms 
of an age-grade category. Overwhelmingly, those who described youth in this way focused on the 
transition from childhood to adulthood. In South Africa, eighteen was the most frequent age 
given for when the passage to adult status takes place, but twenty-one was also mentioned. Two 
respondents cited access to legal rights, such as being allowed to drink or being able to get 
married, to reinforce their views of youth as an age-grade status. Another South African 
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respondent described eighteen as an age of freedom and empowerment: “Eighteen is when 
children become big people. When you are eighteen, you are like finished with school and you 
can do what you dream about. You can make your dreams come true after eighteen.” 
 In Northern Ireland, respondents likewise described youth in terms of a transition 
between childhood and adulthood. However, in contrast to South Africa, the majority considered 
sixteen to be the age at which this transition occurs, although eighteen was cited by a couple of 
respondents. Again, a focus on age-related factors was often associated with the identification of 
youth as a period in which one is granted greater legal rights, such as the right to drink or the 
right to employment. One respondent from Northern Ireland described youth as an age range, 
rather than a specific age figure, “If you look at...the membership in terms of political youth 
wings, it draws from like 15 to 29. So, twenty-nine, some would argue, isn’t too youthful...but in 
terms of Ireland and the context we live in, or whatever, that’s what you’re looking at.” 
Interestingly, this response identifying youth in terms of age of membership for a political youth 
wing was the only answer among all respondents which defined youth as a predominantly 
political concept. 
 Youth as a process of physical maturation.
 Eighteen is the legal age of majority in both Northern Ireland and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, despite these legal similarities, respondents in Northern Ireland indicated that the 
transition to adulthood takes place at an earlier age when compared with respondents in South 
Africa. The fact that ideas of young age varied between Northern Ireland and South Africa 
indicates that youth, far from being a universal concept, must be considered within its cultural 
context. The designation of youth as a cultural, rather than a physical construct becomes clearer 
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when one considers responses describing youth in terms of physical maturation. The only 
respondents who described youth in physical terms were three male South Africans, who 
described youth as a process of “growing bigger” and going through puberty. Based on these 
responses, physical maturation is not especially relevant in defining youth.
 Youth as a period of emotional and legal responsibility.
 Asserting emotional and legal independence.
 Conversely, the vast majority of young people in both South Africa and Northern Ireland 
consider emotional maturation and legal responsibility central to categorizing an individual as a 
young person. In Northern Ireland, only a couple of respondents rated ‘youth’ more mature than 
children, or identified several ‘partying’ behaviors associated with young people which rendered 
them less mature than adults. Further, none of the respondents in Northern Ireland reflected on 
youth as a developmental period stirred by emotional experience. Rather, in Northern Ireland, 
legal responsibility was the key in defining youth status.
 In South Africa, however, many described youth in terms of emotional maturity, and 
identified youth with recklessness and the assertion of independence. For example, one 
interviewee described youth in this way: “They just wanna hang around teenagers and be on the 
street corners, but adults, they act more mature. [Youth] are smoking, sleeping around, doing 
drugs and that stuff, drinking, going to bars.” Many likewise pointed at the influence of peers in 
determining young people’s level of maturity and responsibility: 
Youth to me is when you go out with your friends and party and all that. They are more 
free [sic] and irresponsible because as a teenager, you like to fit in with your 
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friends...Boys like to be seen by girls. They like to impress other people. Youth are more 
concerned with how they look.
While South African respondents’ connotations of youth were not entirely positive, they 
nevertheless interpret youth as the proactive exploration of normative boundaries and therefore, 
an exercise in agency, as opposed to respondents in Northern Ireland, who generally considered 
youth as the conferring of legal rights by adults.
 Adopting roles appropriate to the social context.
 However, many South African respondents also defined youth by citing the dependent 
nature of children within the parent-child relationship. “In our culture, a child should respect 
their elders and that...but if you become an adult...you have the responsibility of taking care of 
your children, so at the end of the day, that says that if you are an adult, you take care of your 
children, but if you are still a child, you are being taken care of.” In describing their relationships 
with adults, many further emphasized the various roles young people have in relation to the 
social context and their level of experience: 
It depends on what situation you are in, ‘cause your responsibilities differ...My mom is 
[an adult], she has to deal with the responsibilities of looking after children, paying taxes, 
all that stuff. I don’t have all the responsibilities, but I have other responsibilities. I have 
to see that I succeed in my studies, I have to see that I look after my sister, and when I am 
home, I look after the household, because my dad isn’t there, so that’s my responsibility. 
In this example, we see that young people in South African often exercise their agency by either 
assuming roles traditionally reserved for adults, or by exercising leadership appropriate to their 
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social context. In this way, South African respondents’ understanding of youth is predicated upon 
social relationships with both adults and peers, as opposed to legal status.
 Seizing opportunities for personal growth.
  While respondents in Northern Ireland regarded youth in overwhelmingly neutral terms, 
a half-dozen South African respondents described youth in a definitively positive light as a 
promising period in which to seize new opportunities: 
A youth for me is kids who are still going to school, getting that spiritual growth, getting 
that support from parents and just basically doing what teenagers do, what the youth do, 
like getting involved with sports...cause there are programs to motivate the youth...I want, 
especially now, in this year, youth to be a positive thing.
While recklessness and irresponsibility were certainly relevant to the self-understanding of South 
African youth, young age is by no means only associated to negative connotations. Nor are 
explicit political affiliations to be seen as the only means in which young people relate their age 
to a capacity to act in the world.
 For South African young people, youth is clearly an age in which one asserts  
independence, assumes responsibilities appropriate to the social context, and seizes opportunities 
for personal growth. In contrast, however, respondents in Northern Ireland perceived youth in 
less nuanced terms. The overwhelming majority of Northern Irish respondents described youth in 
terms of legal minority status. A few cited economic opportunities, such as being legally 
permitted to work, as opposed to South African youth who viewed employment as the domain of 
adults. 
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 Relatively few respondents in Northern Ireland defined youth as a relationship among 
peers or between parent and child. One, however, classified youth according to the treatment of 
young people by adults in their social setting:  
I would say that the more adult you treat them, the more adult they will be in response. 
Give them responsibility, young people, treat them like they have something to 
contribute, a valuable contribution to make, not just to be seen, but also to be heard.
 Overall, however, my respondents in Northern Ireland had a narrower understanding of 
youth than in South Africa. They focused primarily on legal conditions within their cultural 
context, emphasizing legal rights rather than experiences or emotions. Given the relative 
importance of social relationships among South African respondents despite a breakdown in 
family composition, South African youths’ more nuanced understanding of youth agency may be 
attributed to the greater level of personal autonomy experienced within a single-parent home, or 
by living independently.
 Youth as an imagined but empirically contested label.
 
 The vast majority of respondents, particularly in Northern Ireland, accepted ‘youth’ as a 
relevant category to characterize a specific type of social and cultural agency. Few Northern Irish 
respondents considered youth as inconsequential to their own self-identification and were either 
confused by the word itself, or saw it as meaning a youthful outlook towards life which one 
could adopt at any age. For example, one respondent stated, “I think youth is kind of your 
approach and your attitude to life. It’s hard to explain, but I think it crosses over, youth and 
adult.” 
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 On the contrary, a half-dozen respondents questioned the validity of the term youth in the 
South African context as they focused on the cross-generational presence of problematic 
behaviors. One respondent stated simply: “Adults fight and steal, children fight and steal. They 
act the same.” Other responses concurred: “Youth today has kind of disappeared because people 
are living like the grown-ups,” or: 
You become exposed very early to the adult world here...When you’re underage, you 
can’t do certain things, but the thing is, our life is so unpredictable here. People are like 
fourteen, fifteen years old and they do stuff that an adult would.
Among these respondents, there was a general consensus that adults were at fault because they 
had failed to provide positive examples for young people, even if these respondents maintained 
that young people were ultimately responsible for their choices. 
 Conceptualizing youth in terms of agency.
 While South African young people appear more articulate than those in Northern Ireland 
in identifying ‘youth,’ these responses indicate that a significant portion are nevertheless 
incapable of contrasting youth agency with adult agency. Again, South African respondents’ 
focus on the importance of social relationships in defining youth, while providing opportunities 
for young people to exercise agency by assuming adult roles, nevertheless constrains some forms 
of youth agency to accruing recognition within an adult world. As such, the purposive actions of 
youth and adults appear equivalent, regardless of whether these actions involve caregiving or 
lawbreaking.
 It is clear that, despite the stereotypical dichotomy defining youth as either an anomic 
force of lawlessness, or a positive force of sociopolitical change, young people’s own 
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understanding of their agency is in fact, complex, and not merely dependent on their explicit 
values and orientations. In their relations to adults, young people display a process of self-
identification through interdependence, rather than top-down socialization, and peer relationships 
are as critical to identity formation as parental influence. 
 Moreover, my respondents’ understanding of youth and its associated level of emotional 
responsibility and maturity varies depending on the roles young people adopt in order to navigate 
particular social contexts and challenges. Youth can alternatively be described as a period of 
irresponsibility exercised in a subordinate role to parents, or responsibility assumed by acting in 
the adult role of caregiver to a younger sibling.
Employing Youth Agency in Evaluating the Legitimacy of Violence
 Similarly, young people’s perceptions on the legitimacy or validity of violence were often 
responsive to their definition of youth agency and depended on responses to the social context. I 
asked respondents “What is violence?” and “Can violence help solve problems?” and I delved 
deeper by asking whether there are circumstances in which violence is acceptable or necessary. I 
grouped their responses according to whether they viewed violence as: 1) unjustifiable or 
unacceptable; 2) morally wrong, but socially understandable, or 3) a legitimate response to social 
conditions.
 Violence is unjustifiable or unacceptable.
 Within a moral and legal context.
 Many South African respondents viewed violence as unjustifiable or unacceptable, even 
among gang members who presumably practiced it themselves. For many of these respondents, 
violence, crime and theft were interrelated offenses with legal or moral consequences. For 
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example, one argued: “Stealing for me is a crime in the case of the law...Stealing is violent, 
‘cause when you want something, you want your money, you get caught, and you go to prison” 
while another respondent answered, “Stealing is a big sin for me because in the Ten 
Commandments it says it’s not OK...We musn’t kill each other. It’s a sin as well.” Considering a 
social context of religious faith, and a legal context in which crime is proscribed, many 
respondents considered violence morally illegitimate.
 Within a domestic context.
 Many South African respondents also asserted the moral illegitimacy of violence within 
the social context of the home. A few described the emotional trauma associated with domestic 
and communal violence. One respondent described feeling scared because of the violence in his 
neighborhood: “My community is not a peaceful place. Sometimes, I am afraid. Sometimes, I 
would just like to run away if there is violence.” Another respondent described his father’s 
alcohol-induced abuse and concluded: 
Adults must discipline their children, but you can do it in a proper way...I don’t think 
violence should be an option in the parent’s minds, because they don’t know what they 
are mentally and physically doing to their children...There was quite a lot of kids in our 
school...that committed suicide, they killed themselves because of that type of violence.
While many scholars cite witnessing domestic and communal violence as a risk factor for the 
commission of future violent acts among young people, these responses indicate that young 
people do not simply passively absorb the violence of their environment. Rather, young people in 
South Africa were engaged in a process of interpreting domestic and communal violence as 
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morally unjustifiable, which influenced not only their outlook, but also their responses toward 
violence in their commitment to either avoiding or abstaining from conflict. 
 Within a context of social censure.
 However, a few South African respondents who believed that violence is morally 
unjustifiable or unacceptable considered not only their personal interpretations of communal 
violence, but also the moral judgements of society at large. One respondent stated: 
The gangsters are bringing everybody down because people coming from outside...aren’t 
going to know that they are protecting us...Maybe they are shooting and then you are 
gonna think, this community is like this and like that. They have a judgment already in 
mind.
Contrary to theories which suggest that youth violence is the product of values inherited within a 
unique subcultural environment, this example shows that while some South African youth may 
justify violence within the context of their personal environment, their perspectives are not 
limited to the values of a particular subculture. This example further shows that youth are not 
only aware of a broader social discourse outside of their communities, they also assess and apply 
the values of those outside their immediate environments through outsiders’ reactions to 
violence. 
 Similarly, some respondents from Northern Ireland who viewed violence as unacceptable 
often saw it as casting their community in a negative light. For example, one respondent stated, 
“We are looked down upon, this area, because of car crime. That was all years ago, but some of it 
still goes on...It seems like the local newspapers and stuff, they don’t publicize the good stuff that  
teenagers do.” In contrast to South Africa, however, the responses from Northern Ireland indicate 
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that while young people were likewise keenly aware of the negative reactions of outsiders to 
violence within their communities, they nonetheless refused to internalize the value judgments of 
outsiders. Respondents from Northern Ireland refuted these perceptions by asserting that 
negative evaluations of their community were a result of outsiders’ ignorance and their own 
relative access to knowledge as insiders. In this way, young people’s status as knowledgeable 
insiders was reinforced and redefined through their moral evaluations of violence in their 
community in contrast with those outside.
 Violence is morally wrong, but socially understandable.
 Within a context of socioeconomic oppression.
 While young people in Northern Ireland often actively refuted negative judgments of 
violence in their communities based on their relative position as knowledgeable insiders to the 
contrary, a few South African respondents indicated that violence, while still morally wrong, was 
acceptable given prevalent social conditions. Often, this was in the case of violent crime or theft, 
which was perceived as a response to adverse socioeconomic conditions. For example, one 
respondent stated: 
For me, its like, [the violence] is the government’s fault...because people is [sic] 
unemployed and they need to eat, and that’s where it starts. They steal now to satisfy 
themselves. For me, it’s like, if the government can do something about unemployment, it 
will be better for all of us.
Another used an illustration:
This thing we’re talking into [a digital recorder], the people won’t even know what it 
is, but I’ll sell that thing for one hundred Rand. The only thing I can buy for a 
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hundred rand is chicken - the chicken will cost me about thirty odd Rand, then I will 
have sixty left, two breads, then I’ll have forty Rand, I’ll buy myself beer. Because 
oppression puts people in a state you feel helpless, so you will drink, you’ll smoke 
dagga [marijuana], you’ll use crystal meth, all those types of things. Nothing says 
you want to, but circumstances force you to do that. The shitty thing about crystal 
meth is, your first or second hit is for free, and the third hit, you have to go get money  
to get it and that is where shitty things get violent.
In contrast to respondents in Northern Ireland, who did not identify socioeconomic conditions 
which justified the application of violence, these South African responses indicate that prevalent 
social conditions of poverty and unemployment are critical to South African youth’s 
interpretation of the legitimacy of violent behavior. 
 Within a context of self-defense or discipline.
 Finally some South African respondents justified violence as a legitimate mode of 
interpersonal relations, not on the basis of socioeconomic conditions, but either as a form of self-
defense or as necessary to discipline in child-rearing. For example, one respondent stated, “With 
[self-defense], other people don’t get hurt. You are violent with the person who was violent with 
you in the first place,” while another explained, “Violence can sometimes be a good thing, 
because maybe...my child...is doing something wrong. I am going to use violence, not to hurt 
him purposefully, but to [teach] him not to do things wrong.” These responses indicate that, 
among South African youth, not only are the socioeconomic conditions in which violence is 
expressed important, the social relationships between parties and the restriction of violence to 
those ‘in the wrong’ are crucial in determining the legitimacy of the action. 
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 Likewise, the majority of respondents in the Northern Ireland context who responded that 
violence could be morally wrong, but socially understandable did so within a context of self-
defense. For example, one respondent contended, “It depends on the situation. Like, if they’re 
really gettin’ stuck into you, and you can’t do nothin’ about it, you’ll have to go out the back.” 
Again, the legitimacy young actor’s assign to violent behavior is dependent upon the motivations 
behind the act, rather than the mere presence of violence in the community and family.
 Implications for youth agency.
 Overall, responses from Northern Ireland and South Africa indicate that young people 
justify violence based upon their own interpretations of the legitimacy of both its social context 
and actors’ rationale, as opposed to by simply witnessing violence in the home or immediate 
environment. In South Africa, young people considered such factors as legal and religious 
proscriptions, emotional trauma, socioeconomic conditions, social relationships, and outsider 
perspectives in assessing the legitimacy of violence in their community. This was in contrast to 
Northern Ireland, where young people actively refuted negative perceptions of outsiders, who 
were considered relatively less knowledgeable than themselves. 
 The marked difference between Northern Irish and South African responses with regard 
to perceptions of ‘the other’ is quite interesting given the persistent spacial segregation of both 
societies. This would suggest that ideas of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are not only more salient among youth 
in Northern Ireland, but also have a greater impact on the manner in which young people assert 
their agency in Northern Irish society. Youth in Northern Ireland appear to express agency in 
confronting ‘the other’ by asserting their status as knowledgeable insiders to the problem of 
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communal violence, while youth in South Africa express their agency by applying perspectives 
of the ‘other’ in their avoidance or abstinence from violent communal conflict.
 Violence is a legitimate response to underlying social conditions.
 
 Within a context of historic sociopolitical conflict.
 Many of the Northern Irish respondents of this study are from interface areas of Belfast 
and Derry where political violence has historically been disproportionately represented (Cairns 
and Darby 1998: 756-757). For example, as part of the Falls Road ward, the Divis Street Flats 
experienced a higher incidence of political violence in their neighborhood than across all of East 
Belfast (Fay et. al. 1999). Moreover, given the historical context of the Divis Street riots in 
September, 1964, civil rights demonstrations and rioting in the Bogside neighborhoods in 
October of 1968, August of 1969 and July of 1972, as well as Bloody Sunday in January of 1972, 
many of my respondents are residents of areas which witnessed some of the most provocative 
incidents of political violence during the whole of the Troubles (McKittrick and McVea 2002: 
244-253).  
 Nonetheless, Strabane and Omagh, where the remainder of our respondents claim 
residence, did not escape the Troubles unscathed. Despite the fact that Strabane, is in a relatively 
rural locale, it is ranked highest in terms of spatial deprivation and is eighth in a geographical 
ranking of resident deaths and number of fatal incidents occurring during the Troubles (Fay et. al 
1999). Omagh, on the other hand, witnessed what is often regarded as one of the most 
devastating incidents of the Troubles in July of 1998 as republican dissidents under the moniker 
of ‘The Real IRA’ exploded a bomb outside a shopping center, killing twenty-nine civilians 
(McKittrick and McVea 2002: 223). 
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 Given this local historical context of concentrated experiences with political violence in 
the communities where my interviews were conducted, many respondents in Northern Ireland 
argued that violence can be understood in light of past political conditions. In Northern Ireland 
this mainly refers to the continued presence of paramilitary organizations in working-class 
communities. One respondent contended: “People get carried away, which they shouldn’t do. 
They see it as political. It’s what was done twenty to thirty years ago and they see it in that time 
and in that light.” Another, describing so-called ‘punishment shootings’ by local paramilitary 
members to reprimand anti-social behavior and substance abuse among youth or confront 
suspected informers, argued:
We’re sort of like, that’s the way it is, that’s the way our society is...it doesn’t really 
shock people. They’ll say, ‘Oh God, that’s terrible,’ but at the same time won’t be sitting 
in a state of shock hearing that somebody’s shot or somebody’s beaten by the 
paramilitaries...here...in the working class, there’s violence.
Responses such as these indicate that familiarity with political violence can constrain Northern 
Irish respondents’ expression of purposive agency, in that their response is one of apathy, rather 
than reinterpretation or re-articulation of existing societal norms.
 Ascertaining the degree to which political violence contributes to the historical memories 
of residents in Worcester and Oudtshoorn is no easy task. Despite the fact that South Africa 
under the apartheid regime was a highly spatially segregated society, there have been practically 
no studies conducted regarding the geographic distribution of political violence during the 
apartheid era. Understandably, there is considerable difficulty accessing such statistics, as the 
South African Police Service under the apartheid government, for obvious reasons, did not seek 
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to chronicle the murdering of blacks and coloureds by state forces, especially when these 
incidents occurred in non-white townships. Moreover, Coloured politics have generally been 
ignored in studies of black resistance, some researchers rejecting the notion that Coloureds 
constitute a separate political entity and focusing instead on black resistance movements (Lewis 
1987: 1).
 However, even when these statistics are compiled, they inevitably reflect an urban bias, 
concentrating on the highly-populated cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban, 
for example (Booth and Biyela 1988; Mangananyi 1990: 33). As such, it is difficult to determine 
whether Worcester or Oudtshoorn constituted particular flashpoints of conflict during apartheid. 
Considering this lack of access to empirically reliable data concerning rural and peri-urban South 
Africans’ experiences of political violence during apartheid, it is no wonder that my respondents 
spoke of South Africa’s apartheid legacy in a more general sense, and appeared less familiar with 
the historical particulars of the apartheid era than their Northern Irish counterparts.
 Nevertheless, given their more general knowledge of discrimination and relative 
deprivation of non-whites during apartheid, a number of South African respondents described 
violence not only as understandable on the basis of past conflicts and traumas, but also as a 
legitimate response to prevalent social conditions. Often, they justified violence as a response to 
grievances inherited from apartheid. For example, one respondent stated:
It’s the history of the country that leads people to violence. You get black people that’s 
violent...You get coloured people that’s violent. You don’t get white people that often 
that’s violent because they’ve got money. I think it’s only the apartheid years that made 
people violent...Coloureds and that, they’ll be violent in principle...like if you do 
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something wrong towards your own culture...they will show you, you listen here, if you 
want to be violent, go and be violent against the whites.
 In contrast to Northern Ireland, past political significations of violence appear to be a greater 
predictor of agency among South African youth, as some are engaged in a discursive process of 
justifying current violence by repurposing the political significations of violence under apartheid, 
rather than simply reacting apathetically on the basis of familiarity. 
 A few South African respondents also justified violence as a means of collective self-
defense, or defending the community from outside attack, which was also a constant 
preoccupation under apartheid but is now reframed as preventing the intrusion of violent 
criminal gangs. One respondent stated: 
I talk to the gangsters and...as they say, their policy is to protect the people around them 
from incoming gangs. If they see gangs from another community coming to harm us, they 
will protect us...It is more people outside that are at risk.
For another respondent, gangsterism was a means of financial security in a context of high 
unemployment and poverty: “The only way to make money and provide for your own family is 
when you become a gangster.” Thus, among South African youth, violence is perceived as an 
exercise of agency in the sense that it is a course of action taken to ensure one’s personal and 
financial security.
 This is in contrast to respondents in Northern Ireland where, while many more 
respondents tracked the causes of current violence back to political conflicts of the past,  
relatively few considered violence to be a legitimate response to adverse social conditions. 
Responses from Northern Ireland indicate that they have elaborated on the political conflict of 
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the past differently. Political violence is generally perceived as a closed chapter in Northern 
Ireland’s history books, rather than something which can be re-articulated in a post-conflict 
context. Still, some, evoking the IRA’s armed campaign, spoke of violence as legitimate within 
the context of defending the community in a similar manner as some South African respondents 
who regarded gang members as protecting community residents from outside attack. For 
example, one respondent contended: 
I think that violence was, well, the struggle with the IRA was, a necessity, is what it was, 
to defend communities. Like George and Pat, here in Derry, they died defending our 
communities from the [British Army] tryin’ to come in. So, it was sort of a necessity 
tryin’ to defend against the loyalist paramilitaries and the British Army.
While these respondents perceived the IRA struggle as legitimate within a context of community 
defense, it was within a discrete context of past political violence, with no implications for 
conduct today. Again, justifications of the political violence of the past limited expressions of 
youth agency in the present, in that Northern Irish youth failed to apply or reinterpret past 
significations of political violence in their attitudes towards political violence today, considering 
them for all intents and purposes mutually exclusive.
 Within a context of maintaining balanced interpersonal relationships.
 Nevertheless, a couple of respondents who perceived violence as a legitimate response 
did so within the context of interpersonal conflict, rather than political conflict. Here, they 
perceived peace as an unattainable goal. Some even argued that conflict is essential to 
maintaining balanced interpersonal relationships. For example, one respondent claimed, “I think 
[violence] can [solve problems]. If you fight, then, usually they’re friends after. Because they 
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keep fighting and they’re just gonna get fed up with it then.” Responses like this indicate that 
among a minority of youth in Northern Ireland, interpersonal conflict may be seen as a way to 
diffuse social tensions, rather than perpetuate them, and can be adaptive within certain social 
contexts.
 Implications for youth agency.
 Overall, the majority of respondents in both Northern Ireland and South Africa believed 
that violence is morally unacceptable. However, the majority of respondents in South Africa also 
recognized social conditions in which violence could be considered a way to exercise agency to 
adapt to a social context based on past political uses of violence and to imagine relationships 
within the community today. This was in contrast to respondents in Northern Ireland, who treated 
political violence today with apathy, and generally disregarded persistent violence in their 
significations of past political violence, neglecting an opportunity to assert their agency. I then 
moved to inquire how respondents experienced violence in their everyday lives in order to grasp 
more firmly how they signify it as a source of agency and as part of the discursive strategy 
positioning them in their communities. 
Asserting Agency by Experiencing and Addressing Violence in Everyday Life
 
 I asked respondents: “What are the main problems in your community?” and “Is Northern 
Ireland/South Africa a peaceful or violent place, or somewhere in-between?” Follow-up 
questions included: “What are the causes for these problems?”; “What should be done about the 
problems in your community?”; and “What can young people do today to help Northern Ireland/
South Africa be a more peaceful country?” Responses were grouped into the following 
categories, based upon the nature of the problems interviewees identified: 1) gendered problems; 
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2) socioeconomic problems; 3) institutional neglect; 4) individual failure; 5) substance abuse; 6) 
gangsterism and organized violence; 7) racism and sectarianism; and 8) domestic and 
interpersonal violence. 
 Gendered violence.
 Teenage pregnancy.
 Gendered issues were not discussed by respondents in Northern Ireland. However, a few 
South African respondents considered problems in their community to be gender-related. 
Concerning gendered problems, the most common responses mentioned teenage pregnancy. For 
example, one respondent stated:
From my class, from Grade 10, 11, and 12, there used to be five or six girls 
pregnant...because they get pregnant, they apply for grants from the government, but they 
don’t support their children with the money that they get from the government. They take 
that money, go to the parties on weekends, go to the clubs.
A couple of other respondents adopted a more forgiving tone, arguing for example, “[Other 
students] judge the person [who is pregnant] and I don’t think it’s nice to judge.” The 
stereotyping of grant-receiving pregnant young women by South African males certainly 
contributes to the phenomenon of gendered violence in South African society. Further, by 
imposing damning meanings on young women who have seized socioeconomic opportunities as 
a result of their pregnancy, South African males reassert their gendered authority and limit 
opportunities for young women to express agency in establishing financial independence.  
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 Rape.
 In South African communities, rape constitutes another exercise of male authority at the 
expense of women’s agency. While rape was regarded as a serious problem, it was rarely 
discussed among South African respondents, and was always mentioned within the context of 
other problems such as personal safety and crime. For example, one respondent, discussing 
sexual assault, stated, “My mom has told my younger sister to go early to bed..don’t walk with 
the bigger guys...just sleep, don’t go.” All of these discussions highlighted an implied fragility 
and helplessness inherent to being female. For example, when asked what violence meant to him, 
one respondent recounted the following story:
[Violence is] when another person rapes a girl. One kid came there in the Kibbutz and 
there were only girls here, they sleep there...the other people were gone and there were 
only two girls in the house and they break in and they stole things. They can do anything 
to her, if she doesn’t get awake, but she got awake and the person get away...[That’s 
violent] ‘cause men know that...they are stronger than the girl and if they try to hurt the 
girl, the girl can do nothing. Violence is when someone hurts someone who can’t defend 
themselves.
Implications for youth agency.
 The fact that South African respondents condemned sexual violence against women on 
the grounds that female’s are inherently unable to fight off potential attackers indicates that the 
onus of responsibility for rape lies among women, due to their defenseless condition. Again, 
gendered problems appear to have robbed South African young women of their agency and 
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power, as they are intrinsically deprived from taking purposive action to address and confront 
sexual violence.
 However one respondent related rape not simply to an inherently weak female condition, 
but also to a corrupt police force which often perpetrated the rape itself. Corruption within the 
police force was seen as a major factor in perpetuating violence, and even teenage pregnancy. In 
addition to failing to respond swiftly to communal conflict, one respondent contended, 
Some of the police are involved with the gangs, some of them even work undercover for 
the gangs. They go out and just watch what others are doing and then...they will say, like, 
you can go to that club there and make some violence and we will come and just arrest 
[the others]...There are some police that just come and get the teenagers pregnant and just 
leave them like that.
 Here we see the blame for rape shifted to law enforcement personnel, but the underlying 
assumptions remain unchanged. As is true of other gendered problems we have discussed, young 
South African women are signified as defenseless and in need of protection, in this case, from 
male law enforcement officials. Seen as incapable of act ing to confront sexual violence in their 
communities, South African young women are denied an opportunity to exert their agency and 
reliant upon a shift in male’s hegemonic position over their process of identification.
 Violence to navigate socioeconomic conditions.
 Unemployment.
 While gendered problems were not frequently mentioned by respondents in either South 
Africa and Northern Ireland, many South African respondents described the problems facing 
their communities in terms of prevalent socioeconomic conditions. For example, unemployment 
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and poverty were often cited as the underlying causes behind overt violence. One respondent 
described the relationship between unemployment and violence in this way:
 I think there’s one problem that causes a lot of problems after that. It’s like a chain effect. 
The most common problem is unemployment. People aren’t employed and they are 
dependent on social grants, and because of that they suffer, and they suffer in poverty. So, 
all of the social problems are caused by unemployment in the sense that I don’t have a 
[job], I can’t provide properly for my family. I can’t buy the basic things they need, and 
that causes tension, stress in an environment, in the home. The father maybe can’t handle 
the pressure of not being able to provide fully for his family, so maybe he abuses 
alcohol...and that can relate to the fact that he can become violent and then he can abuse 
his family, so...the source of the problems comes from unemployment. It’s like a seed 
which grows into other problems.
In this example, substance abuse and, in turn, domestic violence are the result of a repression of 
more legitimately perceived forms of adult agency, namely gainful employment.
 Poverty.
 Yet South African respondents not only related unemployment, substance abuse and 
violence within the context of adult agency; many also considered these factors as instrumental 
in defining youth potential. For example, one respondent contended: 
In my community...children from eleven and twelve start using alcohol because of 
unemployment. I think, in my town, if there’s no bread in your house, you don’t want to 
go to school...now you want to use crystal meth...it’s all you can do, the action you take. 
It starts at home, with poverty in the home. 
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This response describes substance abuse as a purposive action taken by youth when educational 
opportunities are restricted by unemployment and poverty.
 Many South African respondents likewise emphasized the impact of poverty on their 
ability to achieve an education. One respondent stated, for example, “I think money is a really 
big problem in this area for people to study further because we don’t get much scholarships 
here.” The youth’s inability to attain a higher education was seen as a causal factor in gang 
recruitment, as young South Africans joined gangs as a purposive course of action taken to 
ensure financial security and secure social recognition, in the absence of legitimate educational 
alternatives.
 A few South African respondents, however restricted their discussion to the emotional 
stigma associated with coming from a poor community, or with being poor in South Africa. One 
street child described the experience of begging in this way: 
You don’t have friends or food. Sometimes people think that you are not good enough. 
Not just because you don’t have money, also...when you ask someone for something, they  
will say they don’t have because they don’t want to give.
However, others argued that poverty was so common in South Africa that it is no longer 
stigmatized, but merely a fact of life. The emotional trauma of poverty did not appear to have 
had a significant impact on their peers’ decisions to engage in violent behavior.
 In contrast, in Northern Ireland, the vast majority of respondents denied that poverty was 
a problem for their community, stating that they came from middle-class areas. Even among the 
few who did state that they came from a working-class community, there was great hesitancy to 
SYMBOLIC ASSOCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE 72
describe it in terms of being impoverished. For example, one respondent described the sense of 
community solidarity which exists in his community as a source of wealth:
In terms of need, there’s nobody needs anything in our community, and everybody sticks 
together. That’s the thing, you know, [when] you use the term ‘poor’ and ‘rich.’ Our 
community’s probably richer in a lot of things that other people would want, in terms of 
that community spirit, in terms of helping each other...Relatively...when I go away 
anywhere, I always just am impressed with how lucky I am, and how much we actually 
have.
The hesitancy in characterizing one’s community as impoverished may, like Northern Irish 
respondent’s rejection of outsider perspectives towards car crime, be rooted in the strength of 
persistent community identities based upon an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality. Acknowledging poverty  
in one’s community may be perceived as a concession to the superiority of ‘the other,’ 
strengthening the agency of the ‘other’ community in competing for social recognition.
 Nevertheless, several respondents in Northern Ireland did discuss poverty in terms of a 
lack of facilities, unemployment, and the historic underdevelopment of the West of Northern 
Ireland:
In terms of myself growing up, I come from a working-class background...Social 
deprivation and stuff was on my doorstep...the river Bahn in the North of Ireland splits up 
East and West. East you have Belfast, and there was a lot of centralization and work 
placement. West of the Bahn was neglected, so you had high levels of social deprivation, 
you get high levels of claimants on welfare, benefits, and stuff like that there, so that’s the 
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kind of background that I grew up in like the rest of the lads. So that’s an area, in short, 
poor, for want of a better word.
With this response, nonetheless, any potential slight to the respondent’s community is averted by 
his focus on the Unionist state’s underdevelopment of his nationalist area. Thus, in claiming 
systematic socioeconomic repression at the hands of the ‘other’ community, this respondent is 
asserting his own community’s moral superiority, justifying its collective grievances, and 
strengthening its agency in claiming compensation.
 Violence to counteract institutional neglect.
 Inadequate housing allocation and poverty.
 Just as underdevelopment by the state was viewed as a contributing factor to ‘social 
deprivation’ among respondents in Northern Ireland, many South Africans viewed institutional 
neglect as a major problem in their community, particularly as it relates to poverty, 
unemployment and housing allocation. A street child discussing the government’s housing 
subsidy program stated, “The government should help poor people. ‘Cause part of the 
government[‘s job is to] throw the people out of their homes; they drive people to live in the 
streets. They could help pay their rent for their house.” Government corruption was also often 
cited as an indicator that the state was not doing enough to meet the needs of its citizens. For 
example, one respondent argued: 
Government should help poor people because if government have money to fund like big 
parties and stuff, to fund catering for themselves and so on...you can feed the 
communities with the amount of money you are wasting...They have the authority to fund 
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all of the things that they want to fund...but due to the corruption and stuff they usually 
abuse their powers to dominate and enrich themselves.
Inequitable provision of employment opportunities.
 Some South African respondents also criticized the state’s Black Economic 
Empowerment Program, an initiative which aims to redress apartheid-era grievances by 
providing economic opportunities to traditionally disadvantaged groups, through employment 
equity schemes, among other measures. Several Coloured respondents regarded the black 
empowerment scheme as a form of race-based clientelism which contributes to the ongoing 
unemployment crisis:
The Parliament is full of black people and there is another President who is also a black 
man. That is why they are treating people differently. There are so many black people in 
the road [crews] and so many Coloured people [looking] for work. Wherever you go, it is 
black empowerment. Before they employ any person, they have to get a black person 
first, and then a Coloured person.
 The above responses indicate that among South African youth, there is a significant 
distrust of institutional means to address prevalent social problems or redress the grievances of 
apartheid. This distrust is exacerbated among Coloured South African youth by the fact that they 
feel alienated from a predominately black ANC regime. The alienation of young people to 
institutional change, in turn, negatively affects the youth’s capacity to exercise their agency 
through acceptable political channels.
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 Law enforcement corruption.
 In contrast, in Northern Ireland institutional neglect is often articulated – unsurprisingly, 
given the historic grievances the Catholic community had with law enforcement agencies – in 
terms of corruption and abuse within the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). A couple of 
respondents argued that the police force was simply ill-equipped to tackle anti-social behavior 
and rioting between young people from opposite communities or between youth and the police:
Young people, you have no sense of respect or anything for the police or Sinn Fein. You 
don’t really fear nobody...Police will stand back most of the time and do nothin.’ The 
crowd’s a hundred, over like a hundred people, like, and that’s a residential area. The 
problem is police isn’t nowhere near able to tackle the problems up in Rosemount...with 
the likes of the PSNI, you know, they’re a disaster at the moment. Obviously, there’s a 
legacy issue there for us, but I mean, it’s about trying to ensure that they are playing a 
part, that they’re not recruiting them as informants, and then trying to use them against 
the community as opposed to what they should be doing, which is arresting them.
Nevertheless, the failure of the PSNI to challenge anti-social behavior and rioting was not only 
due to their perceived disorganization in resolving conflict, but was also related by several 
respondents to a lack of respect on the part of youth:  “I’ll be honest with ye, young people out 
here, if they’re in the streets at night, drinking or whatever and they hear the PSNI coming down, 
that’s excitin.’ It does nothing, it does not serve a positive purpose.”  
 With these responses, we can understand anti-social behavior and violent rioting are 
expressions of the antagonist relationship of Northern Irish youth toward police, who they feel 
do not adequately represent their, or their community’s interests. Thus, unlike in South Africa, 
SYMBOLIC ASSOCIATIONS OF VIOLENCE 76
where institutional failure did not implicate any purposive course of action on the part of youth, 
but rather impeded their agency, in Northern Ireland, we can see that institutional failure has 
resulted in an expression of agency as youth express their contempt for an inadequate police 
force.
 Politicization of issues along sectarian lines.
 Finally, a couple of respondents in Northern Ireland contended that the national 
government was failing to address sectarianism, because it set a poor example by feuding itself 
along largely sectarian lines. For example, one respondent stated:
I think that our government in Stormont [the devolved Parliament in Northern Ireland] 
isn’t doing enough to tackle the issue of sectarianism...The nature of the way our 
government is, it’s unionists feuding with nationalists, and nationalists feuding with 
unionists. How can the country move on if the government’s just picking fights with each 
other over party lines?
 These respondents, nonetheless, were engaged in political activities within a nationalist 
political youth wing. Thus, despite their assertion that government was failing to adequately 
address sectarianism, they remained committed to a post-conflict political process. In a marked 
contrast from South African respondents, who overwhelmingly felt alienated and isolated from 
the ANC regime, some youth in Northern Ireland were committed to change via political means, 
and were actively exercising their political agency by organizing other youth around collective 
issues. 
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 Violence as a result of individual failure.
 Poverty.
 A significant minority of South African respondents blamed individual, rather than 
institutional failure as a major factor responsible for community problems facilitating violence. 
In South Africa, many responses which described individual failure as a community problem 
emphasized the linkage between poverty, individual sense of disempowerment, and violence. For 
example, one South African respondent stated:
 Poor people, they are...useless, they don’t want to do anything, they are poor by 
choice...For me, they must help themselves first. The government doesn’t do enough to 
help the poor, but from my point of view, poor people just think about themselves they 
don’t want to get up themselves and make a living, they want to live off of the 
government.
As we have previously stated, among South African respondents, witnessing domestic and 
communal violence actually served as a deterrent to young people forming attitudes which 
legitimate violent behavior. However, it appears, with regards to South African respondent’s 
views on individual responsibility, that socioeconomic disempowerment is seen as a causal factor 
in reproducing violence. Nevertheless, it is an exercise of individual choice, or agency, in the 
sense that young people are ‘choosing’ to live off of the government and engage in illegitimate 
means of earning a living, either through gangsterism or drug related violence.
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 Gangsterism.
 As they cast the responsibility and the impacts of violence mostly at the individual level, 
some South African respondents emphasized personal perseverance and a positive attitude in 
avoiding the pitfalls of youth violence and gangsterism: 
My father was an ex-gangster, I was born around that in the street, but I don’t feel as 
though you need to be a gangster. I want to make something good out of my life, but 
because of the path [my] father walked, he wants me to be a gangster too.
Another respondent interjected, “You must really have a strong personality to get out of the 
situation and tell yourself that I am going to work hard to get out of the situation.” While time 
and again, South African respondents emphasized social and communal relationships over 
individual attributes through their own process of self-identification as youth, they nevertheless 
paradoxically regard violence as stemming from an individual failure to assert one’s character 
and independence.
 Implications for youth agency.
 Overall, the vast majority of South African respondents who linked community problems 
to individual failure complained of a general lack of individual fortitude and character. One 
responded contended:
 It doesn’t matter what people say. In this life, people don’t want you to succeed, people 
don’t want you to be happy, so you have to go out and get it...That’s why I am still going 
forward, I want to achieve my dreams...You cannot blame your circumstances ‘cause you 
need to rise above your circumstances.
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Again, violence is seen as a result of individual, rather than social or collective failure, despite 
the fact that South African respondents overwhelmingly argue that the social environment 
prevents the realization of their full potential and restricts their agency. Instead of endeavoring to 
address the systemic discrepancies within their own environments, many South African youth 
have elected to correct perceived personal failures instead, and continue to struggle in the same 
unreceptive social ecological setting. Clearly, this is in stark contrast to the apartheid era, where 
youth expressed social and political agency by directly confronted structural inequities. 
Nevertheless, South African young people’s attempts to redress perceived deficiencies in their 
personal character can be seen as a purposive action taken to navigate their social environment, 
even if it is a deflected expression of agency.
 In contrast, only a couple of respondents in Northern Ireland related violence to 
individual choices in response to community problems. Several concluded that, to quote one: 
“Many people won’t [talk about things]. They’re too stubborn...They have a reputation as a 
fighter, so they don’t want to sit while people’s talking.” However, responses in Northern Ireland 
seemed to have a less abstract view of personal responsibility than in South Africa, and a more 
focused approach to individual responses reproducing violence. Interviewees discussed, 
therefore suicide, sexually transmitted infections, anti-social behavior, and substance abuse in 
terms of community problems resulting from individual failure. For example, one respondent 
described substance abuse in this way:
You’ll have people living in a big house, and you’ll have people like us, living in a 
working-class estate and dreaming of that. But it nearly becomes just too much of a 
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dream, so they’ll never actually try for it...Then without that confidence, a lot of young 
people drop out of school and turn to drugs. It just becomes a spiral.
Here, in contrast to South Africa, we see individual failure attributed directly to socioeconomic 
inequality, rather than merely to a deficiency in personal fortitude. Thus, Northern Irish 
responses promise policy-oriented opportunities for youth to challenge systemic social problems, 
instead of simply prescribing changes in attitude.
 Violence as a result of substance abuse.
 Substance abuse and alcoholism are major issues in South Africa, however, and were 
among the most frequent factors cited as community problems by nearly every respondent. 
Rather than seeing them as individual behavioral malfunctions, however, South African 
respondents tended to regard them more as responses to broader social ills, such as unequal 
access to higher education, gangsterism and organized crime, as well as domestic and 
interpersonal violence. 
 Domestic violence and education.
 Many considered alcoholism a contributing factor in domestic violence. Several 
respondents also contended that the high incidence of drug use and alcoholism among young 
people and their families was a nearly insurmountable obstacle to achieving a higher education. 
One respondent described the impact of substance abuse on education in this way:
 It’s meth and then it’s weed, and then your basic alcohol, because you see more and 
more younger children being addicted to drugs, children from 9 years, 10 years [old], and 
that’s a big problem in my community, which means they can’t get educated, can’t go to 
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work for [themselves] and a lot of people they drop out of school like in high school. 
They finish in Grade 9 or Grade 10 and drop out of school. 
Another confirmed that substance abuse is not necessarily a problem in itself but was rather part 
of a broader process of socialization providing an attractive alternative to education:
The kids at school, their role models is like the drug dealers, because they’ve seen guys 
like 18, 19, driving good cars, fancy cars, living in fancy houses and now they also say, 
‘Why do I have to be in school when I can do that?’...But when they are finished, most of 
the kids in school don’t get bursaries to got to colleges or universities
These responses demonstrate that substance abuse is not only restrictive in terms of inhibiting 
South African youth’s educational attainment, but that it can also be an adaptive course of action 
when educational opportunities are, or are perceived to be, out of reach. Thus, some South 
African youth are socioeconomic agents in their substance abuse, as they deal drugs to navigate a 
context of unequal access to higher education.
 Organized crime and territoriality.
 Many South African respondents also related substance abuse to crime, and in particular, 
to organized crime and gangsterism. Several respondents described the conflict in their 
community as stemming from the strategies of territorial control of competing drug dealing 
actors:
For example, we have two druglords and this one is selling more than this one, they are 
gonna get a little jealous. Then you will come and you will shoot that guy. If he’s got a 
gun, then you will shoot each other. All of the gangs are affiliated with the druglords. 
That’s their main source of income.
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Spatial territory is claimed and reclaimed through the exercise of violence among youths as they 
compete for social dominance. Thus, through gang wars, South African young people are 
exerting a degree of control as purposive agents over their spatial environments.
 Anomic violence.
 Some described substance abuse among gangsters as exacerbating or heightening social 
tensions. One respondent recounted an incident in which drugs had contributed to communal 
violence and spurred gang recruitment:
A year or two back in our community, a gang fight [arose because] there wasn’t any 
booze, no alcohol, and there weren’t drugs available in the town. So what one of the 
gangs did in the town, to be high...they were violent, they stabbed people, everywhere 
they went in the street...They stabbed...about eleven people and one person died, a young 
person died that day, and that got a big stir for the gangs.
Even in this seemingly anomic act of violence, South African young people were contesting their 
lack of access to resources (drugs) and asserting the relative social status of their respective gang 
in order to generate recruitment. Thus, this instance of youth violence can again be recognized as 
an expression of agency in navigating the social environment.
 As opposed to South Africa, in Northern Ireland, drug abuse was not considered quite as 
common, but was nevertheless often cited as a contributing factor, along with underage drinking, 
in provoking anti-social behavior among youth. For example, one respondent explained anti-
social behavior in terms of boredom compounded by alcohol abuse:
There is a term here in Ireland that kinda has been bandied about recently, ‘recreational 
rioting’...It’s just on Friday nights, if you look at urban centers like Belfast or Derry, you 
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always see young people standing around with alcohol...and whenever alcohol gets in, 
people become brave...So you have situations developing like that there that’s just a 
culmination of boredom and nothing to do.
Among Northern Irish respondents, alcohol was also perceived as contributing to sectarian 
violence, especially when accompanied by provocative social events, such as football matches or 
parades. Alcoholism was seen as widespread, but drug use seemed instead to be an increasing 
problem, rather than one which had already reached epidemic proportions. While in South 
Africa, substance abuse and the violence attributed to it was often tied purposively to the 
accumulation of social and economic advantage, in Northern Ireland, it appears to be merely the 
result of boredom and depressive social environments, rather than purposive action taken based 
upon an underlying socioeconomic rationale.
 Suicide.
 Also, in contrast to South Africa, gangsterism and organized crime were hardly discussed 
in the context of Northern Ireland. A couple of respondents mentioned the pressures young 
people face when they are indebted to drug dealers, and how that might be contributing to higher 
suicide rates across Northern Ireland. For example, one respondent explained:
[Suicide] seems to have...escalated. Now in one area of North Belfast, there was a study 
done, on...why this was happening. Trauma was one of the issues identified, in terms of 
drugs being brought into the area, young people not being able to pay back drug 
dealers...and as a result, coming under increasing pressure...that culmination there has 
seen the increase in the suicide rate.
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 Violence in the form of gangsterism and organized crime.
 In contrast, in South Africa, gangsterism was the most frequently cited problem young 
people faced in their communities. For example, when asked what the word ‘violence’ meant to 
him, one South African respondent replied:
[Violence] means to me...when you are a gangster...making people dead, shooting each 
other with a gun...Esselen Park [and] Roodewal, our community, they are not getting 
along well with each other and they are calling names. So when you from Roodewal, 
when you are going to [Esselen Park], they can hurt you, and when they are coming here, 
they can hurt you.
Respondents displayed in-depth knowledge of gang behavior, detailing the initiation process (a 
first kill), indications of rank (increasing numbers of stars), and distinguishing features (tattoos 
and mannerisms) which all point to gang membership.  
 Many respondents also described an incident which had occurred the week before being 
interviewed to demonstrate that gangsterism was a pervasive phenomenon. “There was an 
incident last Friday, when they shoot somebody; the gangsters and the kid jumped over the 
[school] fence. He was a kid who was in the school, but not anymore [after joining a gang].” As 
gangsterism invaded local social institutions, a feeling of powerlessness and abandonment crept 
in: 
People inside the school were really scared you know...but...people from good 
neighborhoods, like a white area in Worcester, if something like this happens, they will 
totally go ballistic, but if something like this happens here in the Roodewal, people will 
be like, ‘Oh, another shooting. Who did they shoot this time?
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 Youth violence in Northern Ireland is often attributed to disorganized groupings of 
disaffected and marginalized youth. However, our South African respondents demonstrate that 
violence in their country is overwhelmingly associated with membership in a gang or collective 
organization. Given the salience of overarching communal affiliations in identity formation in 
the Northern Irish context, South African youths’ tendency to forge their own collective identities 
through gang membership may result from the breakdown in salient racial identities post-
apartheid.
 Violence personifying sectarian or racist attitudes.
 Rioting.
 While gangsterism was considered one of the main contributors to violence among South 
African respondents, sectarianism was often discussed as a source of violence in Northern 
Ireland. For example, several respondents described the tensions surrounding the marching 
season, or parades occurring during the summer months to commemorate culturally distinct 
practices, historical instances of loyalty and successful defense of one community against the 
other, in terms of the Protestant-Catholic divide:
Rioting’s a big problem. The Protestants are rough...It’s like a march for Protestants, if 
it’s like a march for Catholics...Even if the cops are driving through the Bog, they’ll just 
lift a glass bottle or a brick, anything they can get their hands on, just throw it at 
them...It’s because of the Protestants and Catholics. The Troubles. They think the cops 
are all Protestants, whenever like some of them’s actually Catholics too.
 However, about as many respondents disagreed that sectarianism still posed a problem in 
Northern Ireland. Likewise concerning the peace walls, one respondent described the Falls and 
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the Shankhill Roads, two neighborhoods that have historically been the center of violence along 
sectarian lines during the Troubles, in a positive light: “They say, like, Protestants and Catholics 
hate each other. They would say it’d really be more the Falls and the Shankhill, but it’s not, 
because them gates be open all day, everyday...We never have riots, like, with each other.” 
Several respondents also contended that sectarianism is simply a relic of an older generation: 
“Older people hold a grudge. See, younger people, we can resolve it, but see with the older ones, 
it’s not gonna happen because of what they went through.” 
 Although sectarianism was often cited by Northern Irish respondents among problems 
facing their community and society, it was always related to violence in a remote sense both 
spatially and emotionally. Physically, among rural youth, it was seen as occurring in interface 
urban areas of Belfast and Derry. Among urban youth, however, sectarianism was in other 
communities, rather than their own. Emotionally, it was described in terms of incidents they had 
heard about, rather than personally experienced. Thus, respondents in Northern Ireland expressed 
a distinct lack of ownership for the problem of sectarian violence, either through their professed 
limited personal experience of sectarian violence or by their association of sectarian violence 
with other, often older, members of society. While sectarianism may still be a significant 
contributing factor in provoking violence in Northern Ireland, it is clear that, among young 
people at least, it is not especially relevant in their own personal expression of agency when 
navigating the social conditions of their everyday lives.
 Xenophobic attacks.
 Among my South African respondents, racism, which in that country shaped past social 
conflicts, was not seen as a major contributing factor in post-apartheid violence, with the 
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exception of the recent racist and xenophobic attacks against immigrants in the Cape Town area 
and elsewhere. “Last year, we had xenophobia, and the people...just were like, killing each 
other...I think the problem in South Africa is that people keep on judging on the color of their 
skin and I think that is wrong.” However, xenophobia was only mentioned by a few respondents, 
most of whom were not sympathetic to immigrants, but rather viewed them as bringing drugs to 
South Africa and placing a burden on their already strained economic opportunities.  
 The majority of respondents did not connect violence to racism even if they still felt 
judged on the basis of their skin color or ethnic background: 
Sometimes when you go into a shop where there’s white people...they just stare at you 
like you like you are a stranger living on the street...They look at you like, ‘What is he 
doing here?’ If we go to Durban Street, there is only white people living there, and 
[coloureds] are living other places, and then it’s the blacks. People are separated still.
Rather, most considered social relationships within neighborhoods as more predictive of 
potentially violent conflicts. As one respondent explained: 
I wouldn’t say the fighting is racially-based. I would say it’s more community-based. 
Like, if I am from Roodewal, this community, and I go into another community and I’m 
not a gangster, they will class me as a gangster, like I am one of them and they will try to 
beat me up.
Other physical markers, like tattoos, and mannerisms, such as one’s way of walking, were seen 
as more important in identifying members of different neighborhoods, as opposed to simply 
racial characteristics.
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 Nevertheless, it was striking for me, given the country’s history, that South African 
respondents hardly related domestic, communal and interpersonal violence to racism, even when 
they had experienced it themselves. Although South African respondents express a marked 
distrust for current ANC leadership, it appears that the ANC’s original plea for racial equality and 
tolerance post-apartheid has been internalized among youth today. In a post-apartheid context, 
racism is no longer considered a legitimate platform from which to express sociopolitical 
grievances. As a result, youth have filled the vacuum of anti-racist dialogue with discussions of 
personal responsibility and the general failures of the immediate social environment. 
 Domestic and communal violence.
Finally, the domestic realm is variously perceived as an arena where community violence 
is refracted, amplified, and reproduced. In South Africa, domestic violence is a pervasive 
problem and many respondents critically connected it to violence in their communities. One 
described his experience of domestic abuse:
Most of the parents and adults here in South Africa, it’s like when they’re drunk, they’re 
just aggressive and they want to be violent and stuff...I have seen a couple of parents who 
would like hit their kids physically...but I think I was just strong...because I knew my 
parents would start drinking and I would go to my grandmother’s, or just, not go home 
because I would know, in the process I am going to get hurt.
 But perceptions of how domestic malfunctions contribute to community violence went 
beyond directly witnessing physical domestic violence and emphasized broader patterns of 
family collapse. Many related community-based violence and gangsterism to a general 
breakdown in the family structure, including the absence of male role models. 
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In many households...[there’s] a mother figure and not a father figure, and that’s a 
problem for both boys and girls because...their father’s not around...so they go around 
doing that stuff, nobody tells them what’s the right thing and what’s the wrong thing to 
do. They just don’t get it. 
Aside from divorce or separation, many fathers abandoned their families in pursuit of greater 
economic opportunities in urban centers such as Cape Town and Johannesburg. While this 
particular respondent indicated that gangsterism stems from a lack of a moral center provided by 
a strong father figure, South African youths may also join gangs as an expression of the relative 
autonomy they experience without the constraining influence of adults in their home 
environments. In this way, youth violence can be seen as an assertion of independence from 
parental authority, and thereby a purposive form of agency.
 In Northern Ireland, however, none of the respondents included domestic violence as a 
problem for their community. They rather focused on interpersonal violence like stabbings and 
bar fights, of which most respondents did not, on the other hand, have direct experiences. In the 
domestic sphere, respondents categorized, however, intergenerational conflict as not necessarily 
violent: “one problem would be, really, being looked down upon by the older ones, like, the 
adults...Old people are very aggressive to us. They’re cheeky. Nasty, just nasty, nasty people.” 
The lack of discussion of domestic violence within the Northern Irish context is a striking 
difference with its emphasis among young respondents in South Africa. Like suicide, domestic 
violence may culturally be a taboo topic to discuss, or perhaps, domestic violence has been more 
adequately addressed through the strong community assistance organizations and community 
solidarity prevalent to nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Whatever the case, it is clear 
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that, in the opinions and experiences of our respondents, domestic violence is a much more 
relevant social problem in South Africa.
 My discussion of the relations between community and domestic violence brings home 
an important, overall difference between my two case studies. While violence seemed among 
young people in Northern Ireland relatively removed from the immediate sphere of effects and 
human connections, in South Africa, on the other hand, young people’s experiences of violence 
were more deeply personal and reflected not only in their detailed and thoughtful descriptions of 
incidents of violence, but in their more mature and articulate ways of conceptualizing it. These 
differences greatly impacted the solutions to community violence and social problems 
respondents in South Africa and Northern Ireland proposed. 
 Opportunities for agency in youth-advocated solutions to violence.
 Institutional interventions advocated by Northern Irish respondents.
 Proposed solutions to community problems in Northern Ireland were nonetheless varied 
in scope and application. Respondents emphasized institutional interventions like stricter law 
enforcement, prevention coursework supported by government subsidies, family-based 
initiatives, community outreach, youth clubs, lowering the drinking age, and providing 
alternative recreational facilities. One respondent emphasized the importance of positive role 
models in the community, as opposed to punitive action:
Personally, I think people would be much more likely to listen to a community leader not 
coming from an authoritative point of view, you know, coming to talk to ye, as a grown 
person, as an adult, like, giving you the respect you deserve, ‘cause you’re not getting 
that from the PSNI.
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 Regarding sectarianism, respondents in Northern Ireland supported a variety of 
initiatives. For some, “taking down the peace wall” was paramount. Others saw collective, 
cooperative action as the key. One respondent stated simply: “Work together, so we can work in 
peace.” Many emphasized cross-cultural community youth work as an effective means of 
combating sectarianism:
I think there’s much [that] has been done recently in Belfast...it’s bringing together 
members of the nationalist working-class areas, and unionists, bringing them all together 
on Tuesday nights and have a big football tournament, and afterwords then, have 
pizza...It’s the pizza that brings them there, but it brings them off the streets. Otherwise 
then, young people would be standing about, having nothing else to do. 
 Another respondent stressed the similarities between working-class nationalist and 
loyalist youth in Northern Ireland and saw pilot programs which brought them together for team-
building retreats as a promising step towards ending sectarian violence:
You kind of build up a rapport with people from working-class loyalist areas or unionist 
areas...you’re chatting to working-class loyalist young people and engage in their 
perspective and, in a way, it breaks down barriers around sectarianism and ‘the other 
side’ for want of a better word...So you have twenty-five people going back to their 
respective areas, with kind of a different view of things and you know, maybe, hopefully, 
their experience will kind of rub off on others and kinda break down sectarian tensions.
Similarly others supported greater interpersonal understanding and tolerance as the way forward 
for Northern Ireland:
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Forget about...what they hear from other people. Maybe their parents tell them about, 
like, the Protestants, like ‘Don’t be going along with them.’ Protestant’s parents might tell 
them the same, like, ‘Don’t be friends with Catholics,’ but there’s no call for it. Just be 
friends, ‘cause they’re the same. Everybody’s the same. There’s nobody different, or 
badder, or gooder, or anything like that.
 For several, however, change in Northern Ireland is required not simply at the personal 
level, but also at the structural level, in governance and educational policy. 
For peace to be sustained there has to be cross-community work, and it’s great to have a 
weekend camp with twenty-five people from each side, but it needs to happen on a much 
bigger scale than that there. And I don’t think government is doing anywhere near enough 
to help move the process forward. 
Broad social policy changes advocated by South African respondents.
 In South Africa, instead, numerous respondents expressed their view that community 
problems such as gangsterism and organized violence were too deep-rooted to be contended with 
through behavioral improvements or targeted interventions. For example, one respondent stated 
that violence was “like a curse...in this neighborhood. Nothing can happen in Roodewal....It’s 
like if there was a curse, like nothing will come from here.” Several nonetheless contended that 
abstaining from violence was an individual responsibility that comes from an inner change of 
heart, rather than any type of collective action. “No one can make a decision for others, they 
need to decide on their own. So, no one can really do anything ‘cause it’s an individual choice.” 
 Also as opposed to Northern Ireland where the majority of respondents alternately 
emphasized interpersonal cross-community work and institutional interventions, the majority of 
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respondents in South Africa saw improved life conditions as resulting from broader socially-
based policy changes. For example, some considered increased educational opportunities as the 
key to change violent behaviors and attitudes by increasing opportunities for young people:
There’s only one thing that can solve all these problems and that’s education. If you can 
educate yourself, get a good job, if you have a family, then you can educate your 
children, teach them a certain set of values, how to act, the difference between right and 
wrong, what to do and what not to do, how to act and react. If we can do that, we can 
solve violence, because violence, it’s actually a choice. For instance, if me and him get 
into an argument, I can choose to fight or I can choose to walk away. It’s a choice, a 
personal choice, but you can only make that choice if you’re educated. 
Several recognized that education did not necessarily need to be a formal one, but could come 
from witnessing positive examples and proper discipline in the home. “I don’t think you must be 
educated to not use violence. It’s about the household; the parents can educate you in the 
household, if you can’t educate yourself. It starts with your household.” 
 Some South African respondents further emphasized the social and policy side of 
educational access, recommending government funding for early intervention and preventative 
programs to address gangsterism and substance abuse. Some cited grassroots initiatives as 
examples of progress being made to address problems in the community. “In our community, 
they started like a cricket club and now, I can walk in X park because our gang plays against that 
gang, or our community plays against that community for money.” Another respondent proposed 
building and funding shared recreational facilities. “I would suggest if they place a building in 
our community like that, for dance - there is many of the boys in my community that can 
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breakdance or hip-hop or stuff like that, or rap. That would be nice.” Again, while youth in 
Northern Ireland focused primarily on legalistic institutional interventions such as more qualified 
police and lowering the legal drinking age, South African youth focused on broader social 
policy-based efforts which necessitate government funding to implement, but which are 
maintained at the community level.
 Call to greater personal tolerance, love and faith.
 Finally, many South African respondents had in common with Northern Irish 
interviewees an emphasis on changing value systems, stressing tolerance, love and religious faith 
as essential to addressing the problems of their communities. One respondent stated:
I think it first starts with yourself. You should work on yourself as a person and grow 
character within yourself and grow as a person emotionally to be more tolerant of other 
people, in South Africa especially, because we come from different backgrounds, we 
come from different townships, we come from different households, and also we have 
different races, so mostly we speak different languages. So, it first starts with you as a 
person, growing as a person, being more tolerant of other people, and telling yourself that 
yes, we are different, but we don’t have to kill everyone. We should find common ground, 
we can live together in peace.
Implications for agency.
 Overall, these responses indicate that young people in contexts, such as post-conflict 
Northern Ireland and South Africa, affected by massive political traumas, poverty, inequality and 
continued violence, cannot be merely categorized as victims or  perpetrators of violent behavior, 
but are actively engaged in addressing violence on the basis of their perceptions of problems in 
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their communities and the solutions they envision. Despite scholarly discussions of youth 
violence as dysfunctional and anomic, my interviews indicate that post-conflict youth are quite 
aware of the underlying structural and social conditions which shape their world. Young people 
in Northern Ireland and South Africa understand and signify violence within the practical and 
discursive modalities with which they navigate adverse social conditions in their schools, homes 
and neighborhoods. It is by signifying violence as part of broader social problems that these 
youth have underscored their ability to take purposive action to deal with and overcome it.
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Policy Recommendations and Conclusion
 Based on the data gathered over the course of these interviews, I would recommend that 
continued efforts to build peace in post-conflict Northern Ireland and South Africa be based upon 
young people’s own perspectives of violence and its relationship to social problems. This is 
crucial to engaging the youth in a process that overcomes the violence affecting their 
communities, while also empowering them. 
 On issues like sectarianism, anti-social behavior and gangsterism, in both Northern 
Ireland and South Africa, policy interventions to encourage shared recreational spaces in 
interface areas of deprived communities should be based on surveys of local youth to gauge 
which activities are most meaningful to express their autonomous potential. Early preventative 
educational programs should be hosted by institutions that provide support and counseling in the 
case of substance abuse and violent behavior. Young community leaders must be integrated in 
these programs and facilities so that they can act as mediators in a process where the community 
as a whole is invested in these endeavors, while maintaining a specific focus on young people’s 
perspectives and providing youth with positive role models and mentors, an added protective 
factor. Finally, regarding law enforcement efforts, corruption must be challenged and the 
composition of forces should reflect the community they serve.
 Such interventions are necessarily linked to systemic policy interventions. In South 
Africa, for example, stronger provisions must be made to establish need-based scholarships for 
youth from impoverished communities. Empowerment schemes to provide employment 
opportunities to historically marginalized groups, should include all those affected by 
socioeconomic inequality, with particular attention to young people, and not merely traditional 
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supporters of the incumbent political regime. Legislation should also be altered to enable young 
people to receive loans to finance their education by loosening the power of parents or guardians 
as cosignatories. Schools and daycares must be equipped to not only recognize the signs of 
domestic abuse, but to report abusive parents to culturally competent child welfare agencies. 
School-sponsored programs which host tutoring and study sessions in a quiet learning 
environment should be expanded so that the education of young people is not impeded by 
studying in a chaotic family setting.
 Finally, further research on youth violence in Northern Ireland and South Africa should 
move towards youth-initiated perspectives which discuss youth agency as opposed to simply 
sensationalizing youth anomie and marginalization. Literature on youth violence should 
foreground the role of young people in analyzing their own social and cultural environment. 
Fieldwork among young people in post-conflict societies should be aimed at empowering 
respondents not only as objects of research but as protagonists in knowledge production. 
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Figure 1. South African respondents’ self-reported city of residence. This figure illustrates the 
geographic area represented in the South African sample.
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Figure 2. Northern Irish respondents’ self-reported city of residence. This figure illustrates the 
geographic area represented in the Northern Irish sample.
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Figure 3. South African and Northern Irish respondents self-reported ages by category. This 
figure illustrates the diversity of both the South African and Northern Irish samples in terms of 
age.
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Figure 4. Percentage of self-reported guardian unemployment in South African sample. Figure 4 
demonstrates the high level of South African respondents who have either both parents 
unemployed are whose sole caregiver is unemployed.
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Figure 5. Self-reported percentage of families receiving federal income assistance in Northern 
Irish sample. This figure illustrates that the vast majority of respondents’ families in Northern 
Ireland receive some form of income assistance from the government.
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Figure 6. Percentage of self-reported guardian unemployment in Northern Irish sample. Figure 6 
demonstrates the high level of Northern Irish respondents who have either both parents 
unemployed are whose sole caregiver is unemployed.
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Figure 7. South African and Northern Irish respondents self-reported family composition by 
category. This figure demonstrates that the majority of South African respondents, in particular, 
reside outside of two-parent families.
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